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The Law and Economics of Animus
Andrew T. Hayashi†
People sometimes want to harm other people. This truism points to a blind spot
in law and economics scholarship, which generally assumes that people are indifferent to the effects of their actions on other people. Diverse areas of the law, such as
hate-crime legislation and constitutional equal protection doctrine, reside in this
blind spot because they are premised on the existence of animus. I argue that the
assumption of indifference unnecessarily limits law and economics analysis and
that it is both possible and fruitful to incorporate animus into law and economics. I
show that doing so leads to new insights on criminal deterrence, including the underappreciated benefits of damages as a deterrent for hate crimes and the promise
of community-based “solidarity” deterrence schemes. I also show that incorporating
animus can extend law and economics into areas of constitutional law that it has
neglected. I argue for an economic approach to equal protection analysis that is
grounded in the motivations of government actors but that addresses some of the
longstanding concerns with intent-based tests. The examples of criminal deterrence
and equal protection analysis are illustrative of an agenda for law and economics
analysis that more incorporates other-regarding motives more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Animus seems to be everywhere. Seven thousand hate crimes
were reported in the United States in 2017.1 Violent racial, religious, and ethnic animus appeared in the sanctuary of Emanuel
African Methodist Episcopal Church in 2015, 2 the streets of
Charlottesville in the summer of 2017,3 the Chabad of Poway synagogue,4 the Al Noor Mosque,5 and a Walmart in El Paso, Texas
in 2019.6 Less shocking, but of greater frequency, are the more
1
CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVS. DIV., Incidents, Offenses, Victims, and Known Offenders
by Bias Motivation, 2017, FBI (2017), https://perma.cc/VM9Q-ATRE.
2
Jason Horowitz, Nick Corasaniti & Ashley Southall, Nine Killed in Shooting at
Black Church in Charleston, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/9VK6-GQ7K
(“‘It’s obvious that it’s race,’ [Tory Fields, a member of the Charleston County Ministers
Conference] said. ‘What else could it be?’”).
3
Steve Almasy, Kwegyirba Croffie & Madison Park, Teacher, Ex-classmate Describe
Charlottesville Suspect as Nazi Sympathizer, CNN (Aug. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZRL4QX4Z (quoting a former teacher describing the man later found guilty of murder during
the riot as someone who “really bought into this white supremacist thing”).
4
Shannon Van Sant, Poway Shooting Latest in Series of Attacks on Places of Worship, NPR (Apr. 28, 2019), https://perma.cc/6FDE-UX9P (“The shooting is being investigated as a homicide, hate crime and federal civil rights violation.”).
5
Shannon Van Sant, Accused Shooter in New Zealand Mosque Attacks Charged
with Terrorism, NPR (May 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/354T-M8RU (explaining that the
shooter, “a self-described ‘white supremacist,’ wrote an anti-immigrant, anti-Muslim manifesto before the attacks”).
6
Vanessa Romo, El Paso Walmart Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty, NPR (Oct.
10, 2019), https://perma.cc/35GT-YR3U (reporting that “[l]ess than 20 minutes before the
massacre began the suspected shooter is believed to have posted a racist, anti-immigrant
screed”).
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quotidian expressions of our hostility toward each other, such as
the California man who taunted his neighbor by hosting a party
of naked mannequins on his front lawn because of a property dispute.7 Recently, animus has also appeared in federal courtrooms.
The specter of religious animus raised questions about the constitutionality of then-president Donald Trump’s executive orders on
immigration;8 anti-religious animus was the focus of the Court’s
decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission;9 and concerns about alienage animus have tainted
proposed revisions to the decennial U.S. census.10
This depressing list serves as a reminder that animus is not
only an empirical fact of individual psychology, affecting how people behave in the shadow of the law, but also an element of the
law itself. In criminal and tort law, animus can be a predicate for
legal liability.11 And animus that motivates legal enactments can
be a fatal constitutional defect.12 And yet, despite its importance
within the law, animus presents a host of complications. Because
hate is a powerful motivator, and because the presence of animus
is hard to prove, hate-crime legislation has had little success in
deterring animus-based crimes.13 In the constitutional law
7
Adam Frisk, Man Hosts Naked Mannequin ‘Party’ to Taunt Neighbour Who Complained About Fence Height, GLOB. NEWS (Mar. 21, 2019), https://globalnews.ca/news/5080425/naked-mannequin-party-fence. For an analysis of spite in the property law context, see generally Nadav Shoked, Two Hundred Years of Spite, 110 NW. U. L.
REV. 357 (2016).
8
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421 (2018) (applying rational basis review to
find that, “because there is persuasive evidence that the entry suspension has a legitimate
grounding in national security concerns, quite apart from any religious hostility,” the
Court need not interrogate whether the Trump administration’s travel ban was motivated
by animus).
9
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
10 Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2564 (2019) (stating that the district
court found that the respondents had not shown that the secretary of commerce who proposed the census question was motivated by “discriminatory animus”).
11 For example, to obtain punitive damages for a tort arising from contract in
Maryland, a defendant needs to be “motivated by hatred or a deliberate desire to injure
the plaintiff.” Gary I. Strausberg, A Roadmap Through Malice, Actual or Implied: Punitive
Damages in Torts Arising out of Contract in Maryland, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 275, 275 (1984).
12 See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532
(1993) (“In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the
First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of
religion in general.”); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (describing a “basic
equal protection principle that the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose”). The presence
of animus as a motivating factor may defeat the legitimacy of the law as well. Micah
Schwartzman, Official Intentions and Political Legitimacy: The Case of the Travel Ban,
in POLITICAL LEGITIMACY: NOMOS LXI 201, 210 (Jack Knight & Melissa Schwartzberg
eds., 2019).
13 See infra notes 97–102.
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context, where the question at hand often centers on the actions
of collective bodies such as legislatures, there is philosophical disagreement about whether legislative intent is normatively relevant, how it can be proven, and whether collective intentions even
exist.14
Law and economics can help. Yet law and economics has left
the topic of animus largely unaddressed. The primary reason for
this neglect is that economic analysis traditionally and generally
proceeds from the assumptions that individuals pursue their
(narrowly construed) self-interest and are indifferent to the effects of their actions on the welfare of other people.15 In a time of
pervasive animus, would that it were so. The dismal science is
not, apparently, dismal enough.
Notwithstanding the empirical, legal, and normative significance of animus, it is unsurprising that law and economics has
given it short shrift because law and economics has tended to generally neglect the role of intentions. Thirty-six years ago, Judge
Richard Posner noted that “one can read many books on economics without encountering a reference to ‘intent.’”16 This is as true
now as it was then. Whereas noneconomic approaches to criminal
law emphasize the importance of intentions for assigning culpability and blame, economics focuses on actions because consequentialism is its normative framework.17 Judge Posner himself
has made efforts to incorporate intentions into an economic account of the law.18 Still, sustained attention to intentions—and to
animus in particular—has been missing. At this moment, when
animus is both at the forefront of scholarly discussions of

14

See infra Part III.D.
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3–4 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 9th
ed. 2014).
16 Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1221 (1985).
17 See Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 657,
660 (2001) (“Economic analyses of law have tended to ignore intent doctrines, focusing on
rules framed in terms of the actor’s conduct.”). But see Keith N. Hylton, The Theory of
Penalties and the Economics of Criminal Law, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 175, 182–84 (2005); Assaf
Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 430–37 (2007); Jeffrey
S. Parker, The Economics of Mens Rea, 79 VA. L. REV. 741, 769–77 (1993); Steven Shavell,
Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 1232, 1247–49 (1985). Professor Gary Becker suggests that intent may be relevant
as a proxy for the elasticity of supply of crimes with respect to punishment. See Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 194 (1968).
18 Posner, supra note 16, at 1221–25. Professor Louis Kaplow asserts that “understanding donors’ motives is extremely important in formulating estate and gift tax policy.”
Louis Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation, in RETHINKING
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 164–204, 176 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001).
15
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constitutional doctrine and has a regrettably ubiquitous presence
in the daily news, this lack of attention is conspicuous.19
In showing how fruitful a law and economics approach to intentions can be, I argue for a scholarly agenda that incorporates
other-regarding motivations into law and economics analyses
more generally. Although it is common to assume that only selfinterest determines the “utility” of different choices for an individual, this assumption is not necessary for the law and economics approach. Indeed, the assumption of self-interest has been
criticized from both within and without economics as providing
an inaccurate description of human psychology.20 These criticisms
helped motivate the field of behavioral economics, which incorporates insights from psychology into economics.21 Although some of
these insights have migrated from the economics literature to law
and economics scholarship, not all have.22
Behavioral economics has been most influential on legal
scholarship through its studies about the mistakes people make
in pursuing their goals. However, there is another branch of the
behavioral economics literature that has received much less attention from legal scholars: the branch examining how individuals care about the effects of their actions on other people. Individuals with such other-regarding concerns are said to have “social
preferences,”23 such as a taste for altruism, animus, or an aversion
to inequality.24 Although this approach may at first appear to be

19 Economic models can incorporate a wide variety of motivations, such as a desire
to fit into identity categories. See George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and
Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715, 727–32 (2000).
20 Cf. Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, Behavioral Economics: Past, Present,
Future, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 3, 27–29 (Colin F. Camerer et al.
eds., 2004).
21 See Sendhil Mullainathan & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics, in
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 437–42, 437
(James D. Wright ed., 2015).
22 For an early argument in favor of behavioral law and economics, see generally
Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
23 Matthew Rabin, The Experimental Study of Social Preferences, 73 SOC. RSCH. 405,
414–19 (2006).
24 See Camerer & Loewenstein, supra note 20, at 27. For an empirical approach to
inequality aversion, see Dirk Engelmann & Martin Strobel, Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments, 94 AM. ECON. REV.
857, 863–66 (2004). For an analysis of the effect of prosocial preferences on legal rules, see
generally Michael D. Gilbert & Andrew T. Hayashi, Do Good Citizens Need Good Laws?
Economics and the Expressive Function, 22 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 153 (2021).
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a radical departure from economic orthodoxy, in fact it retains the
core apparatus of rational choice.25
In this Article, I apply simple models of social preferences to
analyze the effects of animus and, in so doing, illustrate an approach for the economic analysis of intentions more generally.26 I
assume that an individual has the intent to bring about a consequence if that consequence is motivationally significant to her.
Formally, this amounts to saying that the consequence gives her
positive utility.27 I will say more later about why it makes sense
for my purposes to limit “intent” to cover only consequences that
are motivationally significant, rather than those that are the natural and probable results of an action.28 After all, the legal term
“intent” often covers this second, larger set of consequences.29 For
now, I only note that the idea that a consequence is intended if it
is motivationally significant corresponds to an intuitive and popular understanding.30 Moreover, this definition is easily incorporated into economic models, which can facilitate its widespread
adoption by other scholars working in this area. Adopting this formalism also makes it possible to compare my results with others
in the law and economics literature because it is a definition consistent with those adopted by leading law and economics scholars
Steven Shavell and Louis Kaplow.31
In Part I, I explain how to incorporate animus into law and
economics. I highlight the thorny normative questions that arise
for scholars devoted to welfarism. Specifically, the question of

25 The formal differences between models with and without social preferences are
largely illusory. Joel Sobel, Interdependent Preferences and Reciprocity, 43 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 392, 431 (2005).
26 Judge Guido Calabresi has advocated for a research agenda that explores otherregarding concerns; this project is a contribution to that agenda. Guido Calabresi, Of Altruism, Beneficience, and Not-for-Profit Institutions, in THE FUTURE OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 90–116, 114 (2016).
27 Another approach to modeling intentions comes from the literature on “psychological game theory.” See generally Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, Emotional Responses in
Litigation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 31 (1992). The social preferences approach preserves
the separation of individuals’ preferences and the institutional context and thereby facilitates an evaluation of the institutions themselves.
28 See infra Part I.B.
29 See infra note 53.
30 See generally Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Beyond Intention, 29 CARDOZO L. REV.
1147, 1152 (2008) (describing the “conventional view of intentions” as one that “identifies
intended results by their motivational significance.”).
31 Kaplow, supra note 18, at 176–77. Shavell assumes that a party “desires” a result
if it raises her utility; she “intends” a result if she desires it and acts in a way that she
believes raises the probability of that result coming about. Shavell, supra note 17, at 1247.
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how to account for animus-based utility is a vexing one.32 In
Part II, I revisit the law and economics of deterrence under the
new assumption that actors are motivated by animus. The analysis reveals a surprisingly useful role for damages—rather than
fines or hard treatment—as a deterrent. The analysis also suggests a novel deterrence scheme for hate crimes that I call “solidarity deterrence.” In Part III, I turn my attention from the animus of private actors to the animus of public officials in the equal
protection context. I show how courts can screen for improper motives on the part of public officials, and I offer a proposal for how
public officials seeking to credibly convey the legitimate public
purposes motivating their actions can do so. The solution involves
bundling any action or legislation that burdens a vulnerable
group with a form of compensation to the group that an actor with
an animus motive would be unwilling to provide.33 By focusing on
actions actually taken by public officials, rather than assertions
of intent, an economic approach sidesteps some of the most difficult concerns about the role of intent-based analyses in constitutional doctrine, allowing animus to play an ongoing role in constitutional law but placing it on more solid evidentiary footing.
I. ECONOMICS AND ANIMUS
In this Article, I argue that law and economics should direct
more attention to animus and to other-regarding concerns more
generally. This argument proceeds first by confronting methodological and normative concerns about moving beyond the traditional assumption of self-interest. The second step of the argument is to demonstrate how making even a small change to the
set of motivations that people have can yield new insights into old
problems and open new vistas for law and economics analysis.
A. Caring About Others
The notion that people care about the well-being of other people and sometimes take actions that are intended to help or hurt
them—for reasons not ultimately reducible to self-interest—
would hardly seem to need proving. Neither, one would think,
32 See Ward Farnsworth, The Economics of Enmity, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 211, 212
(2002) (noting that when the assumption of wealth maximization is “relaxed, analysis becomes more complicated, requiring value judgments about how much weight to give to
preferences that have a controversial ethical footing and unclear social consequences”).
33 State legislation bundling a compensatory rider with the inequality-generating
legislation could violate the “single subject rule.” See Michael D. Gilbert, Single Subject
Rules and the Legislative Process, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 803, 812 (2006).
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would the proposition that other-regarding motives are important
enough in social life to be taken into account by the law. Speaking
of our social dispositions, Adam Smith wrote: “How selfish soever
man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render
their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from
it except the pleasure of seeing it.”34
Yet other-regarding concerns have long been absent from economic analysis,35 and it is primarily with the development of behavioral economics as a subdiscipline that economists have begun
to study our interest in—and the utility we derive from—others’
well-being.
Some of the earliest contributions to the theoretical literature
on other-regarding preferences simply amended individuals’ utility functions to account for the consumption enjoyed by other people.36 To illustrate with an example, consider Maria, who has just
won $1 million in a lottery, and her brother Juan. Predicting what
she will do with her $1 million requires understanding what she
values. If Maria cares only about her own consumption of material
goods, then her preferences will depend only on her own wealth.
We can represent Maria’s preferences with a mathematical function—a utility function—given by 𝑢(𝑤), which takes on higher
values as 𝑤 increases but probably at a decreasing rate, so that
each successive dollar of wealth is worth a little less to Maria than
the dollar before. If these are her preferences, she will keep all
the money for herself.
It might occur to Maria that her newfound wealth could make
family gatherings a little awkward because of the yawning gap
between her standard of living and her brother’s. She might prefer that Juan be wealthier to ease that discomfort. In that case,
her preferences might be represented in the following way, where
𝑤𝑀 denotes Maria’s wealth and 𝑤𝐽 denotes Juan’s wealth:
𝑢(𝑤𝑀 ) + 𝛼𝑤𝐽 . The variable 𝛼 in this case reflects just how much
Maria cares about Juan’s wealth relative to her own. If 𝛼 is positive, then Maria is happier as her brother gets richer and will be
more likely to share some of her winnings with her brother. Conversely, if 𝛼 is negative, then Maria would prefer that her brother

34 ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS part I, § I, ch. I, ¶ 1(Knud
Haakonssen ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2004) (1759).
35 See Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 12 (1992).
36 See generally Hugh Dalton, The Measurement of the Inequality of Incomes, 30
ECON. J. 348 (1920).

2022]

The Law and Economics of Animus

589

be made poorer, and we would expect that Maria will keep all her
winnings for herself.
There are a variety of ways that Maria’s preferences about
Juan’s wealth might vary with the circumstances. One possibility
is that 𝛼 is positive when Maria is wealthier than Juan but negative when Maria is poorer than Juan.37 These preferences would
be consistent with caring about equality. Moreover, it could be
that the magnitude—and not only the sign—of α depends on
whether Maria or Juan is wealthier. For example, Maria might
have a stronger preference for redistribution between her brother
and herself when she is the poor one rather than when he is.38
Adding yet another wrinkle, it could be that Maria’s interest in
Juan’s wealth depends on what she thinks Juan’s preferences are.
For example, she may want to see him made better-off only if she
thinks that he wants to see her made better-off, in which case the
𝛼 in Maria’s utility function would depend on her beliefs about
the value of 𝛼 in Juan’s utility function.39 There is evidence that
people feel this way. People are resistant to wealth redistribution
when the beneficiary of the redistribution is made “better-off”
only because she is envious and getting a bigger piece of the economic pie satisfies her envy.40 Not all preferences, it appears, are
viewed equally.
There are a number of implications of social preferences. For
example, social preferences have been studied by economists for
how they affect compensation in labor markets.41 There is also a
strand within the public economics literature studying otherregarding preferences and their effect on the efficiency of taxation and spending.42 That literature has shown how the optimal
system of tax and redistribution is affected both when individuals

37 See, e.g., Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Understanding Social Preferences with
Simple Tests, 117 Q.J. ECON. 817, 823 (2002) (discussing “difference aversion”).
38 See id. at 823–24. These preferences reflect a concern for relative wealth. Professor
Richard McAdams discusses this phenomenon at length. See generally McAdams, supra
note 35.
39 For research on interdependent preference models, see generally Andrew Postlewaite,
The Social Basis of Interdependent Preferences, 42 EUR. ECON. REV. 779 (1998).
40 See Matthew Weinzierl, Welfarism’s Envy Problem Extends to Popular Judgments,
108 AM. ECON. ASS’N PAPERS & PROC. 28, 30–31 (2018).
41 For example, workers’ satisfaction with their income depends on how it compares
to other workers’. See, e.g., David Card, Alexandre Mas, Enrico Moretti & Emmanuel Saez,
Inequality at Work: The Effect of Peer Salaries on Job Satisfaction, 102 AM. ECON. REV.
2981, 2992–98 (2012).
42 See, e.g., L OUIS K APLOW, T HE T HEORY OF T AXATION AND P UBLIC
ECONOMICS 110 (2011).
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derive utility from their relative consumption in society43 and
when they exhibit altruism or jealousy.
A good example of the fruitfulness of modeling these preferences is Professor Louis Kaplow’s work on charitable giving,
which has demonstrated that it remains optimal to subsidize
charitable giving even when people are altruistic.44 Professor
Richard McAdams has written at length about “relative preferences,” arguing that people often are motivated to position themselves in a particular place within certain social hierarchies, defined by reference to consumption or activity levels.45 This “ladder
climbing,” done for its own sake, is socially wasteful because of its
zero-sum nature.46 Professor Ward Farnsworth has provided a nuanced analysis of enmity and whether it weighs in favor of damages
rather than equitable remedies.47 Ultimately, Farnsworth argues
that although enmity can sometimes be a force for good, depending on its “origins and expression,”48 it should be ignored by courts
in fashioning remedies because of the practical difficulty in distinguishing between good and bad enmity.49 Economists Tilman
Klumpp and Hugo Mialon explore the implications of animus
(which they call “hatred”) on strategic interactions in a game-

43 See Michael J. Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski, Optimal Redistributive Taxation When
Individual Welfare Depends upon Relative Income, 92 Q.J. ECON. 589, 599 (1978).
44 Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 473 (1995).
45 McAdams, supra note 35, at 48. Following this line of scholarship, see Nestor M.
Davidson, Property and Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 773–94 (2008); and Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, Absolute Preferences and Relative Preferences in Property Law, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 2157, 2159–65 (2012).
46 McAdams, supra note 35, at 55–59. Relative preferences can generate similar predictions to models of animus but are importantly different. McAdams distinguishes inherently conflicting relative preferences, which is the case with animus, with “relative preferences that do not conflict because one of the conditions of inherent conflict is absent.”
Id. at 49–55. On one particular kind of negative relative preference, envy, see Guido
Calabresi, An Exchange About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 553, 556 (1980); and Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82
J. POL. ECON. 1063, 1088–90 (1974). Beginning with Gary Becker’s seminal book, originally published in 1957, a very large economics literature on discrimination has developed.
See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971).
47 See generally Farnsworth, supra note 32. For other analyses of the relevance of
emotions or hard feelings on negotiation, bargaining, and remedies, see Ward Farnsworth,
Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 391–420 (1999); and Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89
GEO. L.J. 1977, 2006–10 (2001).
48 Farnsworth, supra note 32, at 213. Enmity is generally regarded as an unconstitutional basis for public actions. See Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 69, 78–79 (1996).
49 Farnsworth, supra note 32, at 240–45.
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theoretic framework50 and identify some of the general implications for deterring hate crimes that I discuss at length in Part II.
Kaplow’s, Klumpp and Mialon’s, McAdams’s, and Farnsworth’s
work should be just the tip of the iceberg in terms of scholarship
on other-regarding preferences, but in fact they are among the
rare examples of the fruitfulness of studying this topic. For otherregarding preferences to be generative of a significant body of
scholarship, it is important to be able to model such preferences
so that the formal analysis that characterizes the economic approach to law can be used. Reducing other-regarding concerns to
tractable mathematical formalisms will necessarily flatten the
underlying psychology and require subtle and modest interpretation to avoid overclaiming, but these formalisms will also result
in greater transparency and precision in the analysis of otherregarding concerns. Moreover, as I demonstrate in this Article in
the case of animus, it can suggest new ways of approaching old
problems.
All of this is to say that it would be desirable for law and economics scholars to exploit research on social preferences, even if
the law itself took no notice of our motives and intentions, because
doing so generates better models of individual behavior in the
shadow of the law than models based solely on wealth maximization. But, of course, the law does take notice of our motives and
intentions. Fact finders are often tasked with determining
whether an individual gave due weight to the interests of another
person when they acted or whether that individual had improper
motives.51 To understand the properties of such legal rules, scholars must allow for the possibility that people are capable of the
psychology that the law assumes they are. Given the empirical
significance of other-regarding concerns as a motivation for action, and the fact that such concerns are a predicate for liability
across a wide range of areas of the law, one would expect that law
and economics would have more enthusiastically embraced models of social preferences and applied them in the many areas of
law where intentions matter. And yet, this has not been the case.
Intentions have, for the most part, been neglected by law and economics scholarship.52
50 Tilman Klumpp & Hugo M. Mialon, On Hatred, 15 A M. L. & E CON. R EV. 39,
50–56 (2013).
51 For example, see the discussion of punitive damages in Strausberg, supra note 11,
at 278.
52 See generally POSNER, supra note 15. Professor Jeffrey Parker has noted that “[i]n
contrast with the legal scholarship, the existing literature on the economic analysis of
crime largely neglects mens rea.” Parker, supra note 17, at 743.
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B. Preferences and Intentions
I say that an individual intends those consequences of her
actions that are motivationally significant, which is to say, she
prefers that those consequences are realized, and so those consequences increase the “choiceworthiness” of any action that brings
them about. Formally, those consequences are included in her
utility function with a positive valence. Defining intent in terms
of motivational significance is methodologically convenient because it allows intent to be modeled in a way that fits comfortably
within traditional economic theory, but it also focuses attention
on the most important aspect of intent for economic purposes: the
influence of intended consequences on behavior.53 Shavell and
Kaplow use a similar definition,54 and Judge Posner asserts in his
seminal work on the economics of criminal law that an outcome
is intended if the actor derives a benefit from it,55 which is to say
that “[t]he intent relevant to criminal liability is the intent to
bring about a certain (forbidden) object by investing resources in
its attainment.”56 This is precisely the effect of including an outcome in an individual’s utility function.
This definition of intention—the actuated desire to bring
about a particular consequence—is narrower than it sometimes
appears in the law. For example, the legal concept of intent is often extended to cover the “natural and probable consequences” of
an individual’s actions, not only those that are motivationally significant.57 Some legal theorists might support a broader definition
of intent along these lines. However, the fact that the legal definition of intent is broader than the definition used here is irrelevant for purposes of this Article. My ultimate interest is in the
53 Professor William Landes and Judge Posner offer three definitions of intent. See
generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional
Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127 (1981). My definition corresponds to their second definition—that one wants to bring about a particular result. The authors assert that when a
person “desires to inflict an injury, he is more likely to inflict it than when the injury occurs
as a byproduct of other activity.” Id. at 129. See Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty
Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1268 (2014) (quoting THOMAS M. SCANLON, MORAL
DIMENSIONS: PERMISSIBILITY, MEANING, BLAME 13 (2007)), for a discussion of the “predictive significance” of intent in the First Amendment context.
54 See generally Shavell, supra note 17; Kaplow, supra note 18.
55 See POSNER, supra note 15, at 275–76.
56 See id. at 276.
57 See, e.g., People v. Gonzales, 256 P.3d 543, 576 (Cal. 2011) (quoting People v.
Prettyman, 926 P.2d 1013, 1020 (Cal. 1996)); cf. Ferzan, supra note 30, at 1157–58.
Professor Claire Finkelstein argues that the dominant mens rea requirement is
knowledge, but she notes that the crimes of conspiracy, attempt, and accomplice liability
are offenses where culpability turns on the intent to violate a norm. Claire Oakes Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 895, 913–14 (2000).
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regulation of individuals for whom animus is, in fact, motivationally significant. An analysis of laws that assign liability on the
basis of intent in this broader sense would require different formalisms than I adopt here and is outside the scope of the Article.
There are a handful of creative explanations for why it might
be efficient for the law to punish people differently for the same
harmful conduct depending on their intentions.58 However, these
explanations all take wealth maximization as the overriding purpose of the law; therefore, they give only an instrumental role to
intentions in assigning criminal punishments.59 This mode of explanation strikes many outside the law and economics tradition
as counterintuitive and stands in stark contrast to other traditions in criminal law scholarship, such as retributivism, which
justifies punishing actions taken with bad intentions more severely because those intentions are normatively significant in and
of themselves.60
The leading account from law and economics about the role
of intentions in the criminal law comes from Judge Posner, who
argues that the primary purpose of the criminal law is to discourage people from engaging in nonconsensual transfers of wealth or
utility.61 Criminal law, with its use of hard treatment and imprisonment, is necessary to discourage nonconsensual transactions
because of judgment-proof defendants, whose limited financial resources prevent tort law from providing a sufficient deterrent.62
Because the purpose of the criminal law is to discourage people
from transacting outside of a marketplace, the only reason to

58 See Parker, supra note 17, at 743 (“[T]he existing literature on the economic
analysis of crime largely neglects mens rea.”). Parker argues that the mens rea requirement facilitates wealth maximization. Id. at 769–77. Professor Assaf Hamdani argues that
strict criminal liability is more desirable when the costs of ignorance are low. Hamdani,
supra note 17, at 425. Professor Murat Mungan does not directly address mens rea, but
he proposes an economic theory of crime that “conceptualize[s] [the mens rea] requirement
as an information-exploiting device.” Murat C. Mungan, The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation, 72 MD. L. REV. 156, 218 (2012).
59 See Alex Raskolnikov, Irredeemably Inefficient Acts: A Threat to Markets, Firms,
and the Fisc, 102 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1149 (2014) (“[The] few scholars who do offer economic
interpretations of intent treat it as an indicator of some objective state of events such as
the magnitude of harm, various probabilities, or the cost of acquiring certain information.”
(first citing Posner, supra note 16, at 1221; then citing Shavell, supra note 17, at 1248;
and then citing Parker, supra note 17, at 745–46)).
60 See David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism, 101 ETHICS 537, 555–
57 (1991).
61 See Posner, supra note 16, at 1205.
62 See id. at 1195 (“The optimal damages that would be required for deterrence would
so frequently exceed the offender’s ability to pay that public enforcement and nonmonetary
sanctions such as imprisonment are required.”).
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make punishments depend on intentions is because doing so helps
the law steer people toward consensual market transactions.
On Judge Posner’s account, intent is relevant in criminal law
because the desire to harm another person helps identify coercive
transfers, reduces the likelihood the actor will be convicted of
wrongdoing, and makes it more likely that criminal punishments
will be cost-effective at deterring the conduct.63 For example,
Judge Posner argues that the punishment for premeditated murder is more severe than that for manslaughter because the probability of apprehension for premeditated murder is lower.64 The
reason to punish acts motivated by animus is that such acts will
encourage wasteful spending on protection by potential victims
and wasteful spending on measures to overcome that protection
by offenders.65
Professor William Landes and Judge Posner identify similar
reasons to account for intentions in tort law. They assert that
“[w]hen a person desires to inflict an injury, he is more likely to
inflict it than when the injury occurs as a byproduct of other activity”66 and that this kind of intent “identifies a class of activities
in which the probability of injury (per victim) is higher than in
the ordinary accident case.”67 But consequences that follow from
actions have no effect on the likelihood that any particular outcome will occur. If I drive ninety miles per hour on a residential
street, the probabilistic harm that this speeding imposes on other
people is identical, regardless of whether I desire to bring about
that harm or not. Outside the realm of magical thinking, only actions, and not states of mind, have causal power. Presumably
Landes and Judge Posner mean that an actor’s intent to bring
about an injury is a good proxy for those unobserved causally relevant features of an actor’s conduct that could bring about an injury. Thus, the fact finder who can ascertain that the speeding
driver desired to harm pedestrians may be justified in thinking
that the driver was engaged in other behaviors (e.g., swerving)
that increased the probability of harm.
My project differs fundamentally from prior efforts to analyze
intentions from an economic perspective. Because prior work

63

See id. at 1221.
See id. at 1222–23.
65 See id. at 1198. Judge Posner’s discussion of animus is limited to “crimes of passion” motivated by “interdependent negative utilities.” Id. at 1196–97.
66 Landes & Posner, supra note 53, at 129.
67 Id. (emphasis in original).
64
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understands efficiency in terms of wealth maximization,68 the role
of intentions in that scholarship is justified only instrumentally.
I do not provide an explanation for how accounting for animus in
the law might be wealth enhancing. Instead, I take as given that
some people are motivated by animus and explore how this affects
efforts to deter such people from antisocial behavior. My approach
begins with the premises that people may be motivated by animus
and that the law wants to discourage such motivations, but I do
not make the normative argument that the law should try to deter
actions motivated by animus.
In the next Section, I define animus and discuss—but not
purport to answer—a thorny normative question that arises
within law and economics when animus is a motivation: Should
the satisfaction of an individual’s animus toward another person
be valued by society? Put differently, is animus a source of utility
that the law should maximize like any other source of utility? My
purpose in this Article is to put economics in service of the normative aims that society has decided upon, and those aims include discouraging conduct that is motivated by animus. My goal
is the deterrence of hate crimes, not social-welfare maximization.
However, for scholars who prefer to marry utilitarian or welfarist
normative commitments to the positive economic analysis I provide here, the question of whether animus utility should “count”
or not is front and center.
C. Definitions and the Normative Question
Suppose that individual 𝑖 cares only about her own wealth 𝑤𝑖
and about the well-being or utility of individual 𝑗, which in turns
depends only on their wealth 𝑤𝑗 . The weight that 𝑖 assigns to 𝑗’s
well-being is given by the variable 𝛼. We can represent 𝑖’s preferences with the following utility function:
𝑢(𝑤𝑖 ) − 𝛼𝑢(𝑤𝑗 )
The parameter 𝛼 is 𝑖’s animus toward 𝑗, so if 𝛼 is positive,
then 𝑖 would prefer that 𝑗 be made worse off.69 This representation
of 𝑖’s preferences means two things. First, the preference for 𝑗 to
be made worse off is motivationally significant for 𝑖. Because 𝑖
68 See Posner, supra note 16, at 1195 (“[E]conomists equate efficiency with wealth
maximization.” (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 66–107 (1981))).
69 In writing down a utility representation, I assume that the agent is guided by
deliberative, rational choice. Alternatively, the utility representation could reflect the way
that people instinctively respond to environmental stimuli, in which case it could capture
unconscious bias.
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intends those consequences of an action that are motivationally
significant for her, then whenever 𝛼 is positive and 𝑖 takes an action that makes 𝑗 worse off, we shall say that 𝑖 intended to harm
𝑗. Second, if preferences are understood, in their colloquial sense,
to refer to attitudes about how one would like things to be, then
the second implication of including 𝑗’s well-being in 𝑖’s utility function is that 𝑖 considers herself better-off when 𝑗 is made worse off.
If 𝛼 is 𝑖’s animus for 𝑗, then we can refer to the term 𝛼𝑢(𝑤𝑗 )
in 𝑖’s utility function as her animus utility. Note here the subtle
difference between 𝑖’s preferences in this example and Maria’s
preferences from Part I.A. Whereas Maria cared about Juan’s
wealth, 𝑖 cares about 𝑗’s utility (into which wealth is only an input). This interest in 𝑗’s well-being, as compared with just 𝑗’s
wealth, distinguishes animus from preferences for positional
goods of the kind discussed by McAdams. To see the difference,
suppose that Maria prefers to be richer than her brother Juan
because her parents consider wealth a marker of success and she
enjoys the status of being their favorite child. But she might not
actually want him to be unhappy, and she might most prefer that
she be richer than Juan but that he have other compensating advantages (e.g., meaningful relationships, work-life balance) that
make him as happy as she is.
Including 𝑗’s well-being in 𝑖’s utility function will have normative implications for law and economics, which generally seeks
to maximize social welfare.70 Social welfare is simply the weighted
sum of the welfare of individuals in society, where welfare is
synonymous with the satisfaction of preferences.71 The weights
that go into the sum allow for some individuals to be given greater
priority than others by society.72 For example, a social-welfare
function might assign a larger weight to the well-being of the
poorest members of society. The extreme case, in which society
assigns an infinitely greater weight to the interests of the least
well-off, is known as a Rawlsian social-welfare function.73 By contrast, a utilitarian social-welfare function gives equal weight to
all individuals in society.74 If we begin by adding the utility
70 Within law and economics there is also an influential view that the proper goal is
wealth maximization. See generally POSNER, supra note 68.
71 See MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS 5 (2012).
72 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in
Social Welfare Analysis, 45 ECONOMETRICA 1539, 1555 (1977).
73 See, e.g., id. at 1546.
74 See, e.g., Roger B. Myerson, Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect
in Social Choice Problems, 49 ECONOMETRICA 883, 883 (1981).
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functions of 𝑖 and 𝑗 to arrive at the social-welfare function, the
question arises: How much weight—which we denote 𝛾—should
be placed on 𝑖’s animus utility?
𝑢(𝑤𝑖 ) − 𝛾𝛼𝑢(𝑤𝑗 ) + 𝑢(𝑤𝑗 )
The utilitarian answer is that 𝛾 is equal to 1 because all utility is valued equally. Note that if 𝛼 and 𝛾 both equal 1, then the
utility of 𝑗 drops out and social welfare depends only on 𝑖’s wealth.
One way of thinking about this result is that 𝑗’s well-being imposes a negative externality on 𝑖 that just equals 𝑗’s well-being.
At the other extreme is the view that 𝛾 equals 0, so that animus
utility does not count at all.
Naturally, the question of the proper value for 𝛾 is controversial, and it has a very long pedigree. One view is that welfarism
cannot accommodate restrictions on individual preferences in the
aggregation process, or at least that doing so forsakes one of its
most attractive features, which is its agnosticism about sources
of value.75 Restrictions of this sort are pejoratively labeled “preference laundering”76 and are viewed by some scholars as ad hoc
concessions to the unacceptable implications of a utilitarian
framework.77 There is a sort of democratic appeal to taking all citizens’ interests and assigning them equal weight in the welfare
calculus. If we move away from an equal weighting of interests,
how does society decide what the weights should be? On the other
hand, equal weighting can lead to seemingly intolerable conclusions, such as the idea that one should weigh the benefits to a
murderer of committing a murder against the harm to the victim.
Many economists who have considered the question believe
that the law does not value all utility equally, labeling these
lesser forms of utility “illicit.”78 For example, Professor George
Stigler asked: “What evidence is there that society sets a positive
value upon the utility derived from a murder, rape, or arson? In
fact the society has branded the utility derived from such activities as illicit.”79 Thus, both philosophers (such as Claire

75

See ERIC RAKOWSKI, EQUAL JUSTICE 23–43 (1991).
ROBERT E. GOODIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 132–48 (1995).
77 See Howard F. Chang, A Liberal Theory of Social Welfare: Fairness, Utility, and
the Pareto Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 173, 195 (2000).
78 See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 147 (1987);
Shavell, supra note 17, at 1234.
79 George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 527
(1970). For a general discussion of the inclusion of moral costs in welfare, see GUIDO
CALABRESI, Of Merit Goods: Commodification and Commandification, in THE FUTURE OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 24, 27–29 (2016).
76
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Finkelstein) and law and economics scholars (such as Al
Klevorick) argue that we must have a normative theory of legitimate and illegitimate forms of utility to avoid repugnant policy
conclusions.80
An alternative basis for devaluing illicit sources of utility can
arise from within the social-welfare calculus itself. If some people
prefer that other individuals not enjoy animus utility, then the
social-welfare function may devalue animus simply because any
benefit from animus utility satisfaction creates an offsetting
harm to those who dislike seeing animus vindicated.81 For example,
suppose that bystander 𝑏 cares just as much as 𝑖 does about 𝑗’s
well-being but in the other direction, so that her utility is given
by 𝑢(𝑤𝑏 ) − 𝛼𝑏 𝑢(𝑤𝑗 ) where 𝛼𝐵 is negative, which is to say that she
is altruistic toward 𝑗. If 𝑏’s altruism just offsets 𝑖’s animus, or if it
pains 𝑏 to know that 𝑖 is enjoying 𝑗’s suffering, then the socialwelfare function would be given by 𝑢(𝑤𝑖 ) + 𝑢(𝑤𝑗 ) + 𝑢(𝑤𝑏 ) and the
animus utility would fall out of the social-welfare function.
My analysis in this Article does not rest on any normative
claim about the proper weight assigned to animus utility in the
social-welfare function. I do, however, take it as descriptively true
of the law that it does not value all forms of utility equally, and
so an analysis of legal rules against that backdrop is worthwhile.82
Readers who are sympathetic to arguments for devaluing animus
utility may interpret the analysis as normative in nature. Other
readers, who think that all preferences should be honored, can
take the following analysis as answering the following question:
If society excludes animus from social welfare, what is the best
way to do that?
D. The General Problem
The problem of regulating actors based on their animus has
a general structure. An actor can take some action that imposes
80 See Alvin K. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and
Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 905, 910–11 (1985); Alvin K. Klevorick, On the Economic Theory of Crime, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE: NOMOS XXVII 289, 298–300 (1985); Finkelstein, supra
note 57, at 903. Some argue that all other-regarding preferences should be excluded from
social welfare. See, e.g., John C. Harsanyi, Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and with Malevolent Preferences, in HARE AND CRITICS: ESSAYS ON MORAL THINKING 89, 97–98 (Douglas
Seanor & N. Fotion eds., 1988) (“[I]t seems to me that even socially desirable external
preferences should be excluded from our social-utility function.” (emphasis in original)).
81 There is evidence that people do not think that utility from envy should be vindicated. See Weinzierl, supra note 40, at 31.
82 For examples of enmity leading to aggravated damages or a new cause of action,
see Farnsworth, supra note 32, at 233–37.
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a harm on a third party. The action generates two kinds of benefits for the actor, which I will call simply the “benefit” and the
“animus utility,” respectively. Social welfare does not include animus utility. Although the magnitude of the harm can be measured, the benefit and the animus utility cannot. This presents a
problem for a regulator who would like to permit the action if the
benefit is greater than the harm but not if the action is motivated
by animus. If the actor commits the harmful act, we do not know
whether it was because it generated a substantial benefit or because it was motivated by animus.
The key intuition for thinking about regulating in the presence of animus comes from recognizing that there is an advantage
in thwarting an actor’s animus motive by undoing, as closely as
possible, the realization of the animus utility. If animus gains are
denied to the actor, then she will only act out of permissible motives. The denial or disgorgement of animus utility is a special
application of the general economic principle that complete deterrence can be achieved by eliminating the gains sought by the potential wrongdoer.83 Implementing this logic requires identifying
a punishment that is commensurable with the animus utility enjoyed by the actor, which requires a close examination of the nature of the animus utility itself.
There are two important distinctions shaping animus utility.
The first distinction is between animus that is intrinsically directed at the victim herself and animus directed with the instrumental desire to hurt someone because it will achieve some other
goal. Consider, for example, a politician who defames his rival.
The politician might be motivated to win the election and would
be just as happy to increase his odds of winning by any other
means. In that case, the politician could be deterred from defaming
his rival by imposing any punishment that reduces his likelihood
of winning the election. On the other hand, the politician might
want his rival to be harmed because of personal antipathy, in
which case the harm is intrinsic to the animus utility. Hereafter,
when I refer to animus it will be this second, intrinsic form of
animus.
The second distinction tracks whether the actor cares about
being the cause of the animus utility or not. Someone may want
the object of her animus to be hurt, regardless of the cause, or she
may want to be the one herself who hurts that other person. I will
83 Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO.
L.J. 421, 421 (1998) (“[C]omplete deterrence is accomplished by eliminating the prospect
of gain on the part of the offender.”).
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refer to this second kind of animus as “malice.” Malice utility is
satisfied by the contribution that the actor herself makes to the
harm suffered by the third party. This distinction between animus and malice is symmetrical with the distinction between altruism and “warm-glow giving” analyzed by Professors Jim Andreoni
and Louis Kaplow in the context of charitable contributions.84 An
altruist is one who derives utility from another person being betteroff.85 A warm-glow giver derives utility if she herself makes that
other person better-off.86 In the case of malice, just as in the case
of the warm-glow giver, the effects of the actor’s actions are a
source of utility to him independent of—although perhaps in addition to—any effect it has on the third party’s overall well-being.
II. CRIMINAL DETERRENCE
In this Part, I analyze the problem of criminal deterrence for
individuals motivated by animus. I begin by describing the deterrence problem in a general way and highlighting the economic
costs and moral concerns that are implicated by the economic approach to deterrence. I then discuss hate crimes laws and the specific moral and legal issues that they raise.
In Part II.C, I describe two solutions to the problem of deterring animus-driven actors. I begin by explaining the usefulness of
thinking about deterrence as a project of thwarting bad actors. If
a potential wrongdoer knew that any harms she desired to bring
about with her action would be undone, or perhaps even that her
actions would have the perverse effect of making the object of her
animus better-off, then this would deter her from taking the action in the first place. This framework raises issues of commensurability between motivations and punishments that may not be
surmountable in all cases. But where punishments can be made
to truly fit the crimes, there are significant benefits, particularly
in very hard cases in which individuals are willing to die in order
to inflict harm on others.
Then, I consider two deterrence regimes for animus-based
harms. I first discuss the special role that damages can play as a
deterrent because of two distinctive properties: (1) damages have
a greater deterrent effect than fines for actors motivated by animus, making it easier to deter those who are nearly judgment-

84 James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm-Glow Giving, 100 ECON. J. 464, 465 (1990); Kaplow, supra note 44, at 473.
85 See Kaplow, supra note 44, at 473.
86 See id.
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proof, and (2) the deterrent effect of damages automatically calibrates to the amount of animus that an individual actor has,
providing more deterrence for actors with worse motives. Damages
thereby implement the logic of thwarting in an especially vivid
way. Second, for individuals whose animus motive is too strong to
be deterred by fines, hard treatment, and damages, I argue for a
community-based deterrence regime, which I call “solidarity
deterrence,” under which the state pools economic resources and
employs legal tools beyond the criminal justice system to thwart
the realization of animus utility.
Under solidarity deterrence, animus-based harms trigger a
communal transfer of resources to the individual victims of the
harm or, more generally, the class of individuals who are the object of the actor’s animus. Because the hateful actor is motivated
to take an action by the harm it brings to an individual or a class
of persons, the transfer makes the action counterproductive from
the actor’s perspective. Solidarity deterrence decouples responsibility for the harm from responsibility for compensating the victims and thereby raises a number of questions of morality, efficiency and administrability. At the same time, I argue that the
benefits outweigh the costs and the risks in at least some cases.
A. Statement of the Problem
To illustrate the problem, it may be helpful to use a hypothetical. Suppose that Michael lives on a quiet residential street adjacent to an African Methodist Episcopal church. In late November,
the church places a large crèche on its property, in compliance
with local ordinances but over the opposition of Michael and the
other residents who view the crèche as disrupting the local neighborhood aesthetic and obscuring desirable views from some of the
homes nearby. Michael contemplates destroying the crèche late
one evening. Let 𝑏 be the benefits to Michael from reclaiming his
sight lines and the neighborhood aesthetic. Let ℎ be the harm to
the church from destroying the crèche. If Michael is concerned
solely with aesthetics and sight lines, the harm that is done to the
congregation will be incidental to his choice. On the other hand,
the harm itself could be part of the point; Michael may harbor
animus for the church because of its religiosity or its racial composition. In that case, the distress to the church would increase
Michael’s desire to destroy the crèche. We can represent Michael’s
animus utility by 𝛼ℎ so that he derives utility equal to 𝑏 + 𝛼ℎ from
committing the destructive act. How can we deter Michael from
destroying the crèche? Should we?
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There are two answers to the latter question. The first answer is that yes, of course we should discourage Michael from destroying property that doesn’t belong to him. This is the sort of
nonconsensual, market-bypassing, transfer of value that Judge
Posner holds out as a prime candidate for criminal deterrence.87
An alternative answer is that we should only deter Michael from
destroying the crèche if the harm to the church is greater than
the benefits to him of doing so, because only in that case is the act
inefficient. I will discuss the second case, which we might call selective deterrence.
The standard economic analysis of deterrence emerges from
the simple premise that Michael will destroy the crèche only if the
expected benefits are greater than the expected costs of doing so.
Suppose that Michael will be liable for the act with probability 𝜋
(representing the perceived probability of conviction), in which
case he will receive punishment 𝑃. In that case, Michael will destroy the crèche only if 𝑏 + 𝛼ℎ > 𝜋𝑃. How should we set the deterrence variables 𝜋 and 𝑃 if we want to deter Michael from destroying the property unless 𝑏 is greater than ℎ? Much of the economic
analysis of deterrence involves trading off the costs of increasing
𝜋 and 𝑃 with the deterrence benefits, because increasing either
the size of the punishment or the probability of being punished
will make intentional destruction of property less attractive.
Punishment, of course, only happens after a series of earlier
events have taken place, so the variable 𝜋 nests a collection of
more “primitive” probabilities—namely the probabilities of detection, arrest, prosecution, and conviction. Increasing the probability of detection involves devoting greater resources to policing and
monitoring, which are costly. Increasing the probabilities of arrest, prosecution and conviction entails greater costs in terms of
law-enforcement time and prosecutorial resources. Manipulating
these probabilities also raises a set of thorny cost-benefit questions, because regulators will generally want to increase the probability of convicting persons who have committed the prohibited
act without increasing the likelihood of accidentally convicting
the innocent.88 There is a large literature in law and economics on
the trade-offs involved in allocating resources to law enforcement.89 A second branch of the deterrence literature is devoted to
87

Posner, supra note 16, at 1205.
See Erik Lillquist, Balancing Errors in the Criminal Justice System, 41 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 175, 175–77 (2008).
89 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public
Enforcement of Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 49–56 (2000).
88
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the costs and benefits of choosing 𝑃.90 Monetary fines are generally viewed favorably because transfers of resources between individuals are close to costless, in the aggregate. The payer is
worse off while the recipient of the transfer is better-off.
In contrast, imprisonment has significant social costs. The resources devoted to imprisoning someone cannot be deployed elsewhere and the incarcerated person cannot deploy her human capital to its best use.91 In the United States, these costs exceeded
$80 billion in 2010.92 Moreover, estimates of the cost of incarceration typically do not include the additional costs borne by the families and communities of incarcerated persons.93 Although incarceration is more socially costly than financial penalties, it may be
the only deterrent available in cases where the offender is judgmentproof or where incapacitation is the only effective form of deterrence. Nevertheless, one of the general takeaways from the economics of deterrence is the desirability of financial penalties as
a substitute for both incarceration and increased policing and
enforcement.94
Moreover, the costs of increased policing, surveillance, and
enforcement must be incurred regardless of whether anyone commits a crime, whereas the costs of punishment are only incurred
if the punishment is imposed. This creates something of a paradox. If one is interested in minimizing the costs of punishment
and the frequency of antisocial behavior, it might be ideal to set
the punishment at an unreasonably severe level. If the punishment is effective at deterring all criminal behavior, then it will
never actually have to be imposed, and so choosing the punishment that would be most costly if it were imposed may end up
minimizing the actual costs of punishment. Of course, there are
many reasons why these results cannot naively be translated into
policy. For example, there are a number of noneconomic and
deeply entrenched norms around punishment that rule out some
90

See generally Shavell, supra note 17.
Incarceration in state prisons cost an average of $33,274 per inmate in 2015. CHRIS
MAI & RAM SUBRAMANIAN, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE PRICE OF PRISONS: EXAMINING STATE
SPENDING TRENDS, 2010–2015, at 8 (2017).
92 MELISSA S. KEARNEY, BENJAMIN H. HARRIS, ELISA JÁCOME & LUCIE PARKER, THE
HAMILTON PROJECT, TEN ECONOMIC FACTS ABOUT CRIME AND INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 13 (2014).
93 One estimate has the total cost of incarceration in the United States exceeding
$1 trillion per year. Michael McLaughlin, Carrie Pettus-Davis, Derek Brown, Chris Veeh
& Tanya Renn, The Economic Burden of Incarceration in the U.S. 5 (Inst. for Advancing
Just. Rsch. & Innovation, Working Paper No. AJI072016, 2016).
94 See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 89, at 70 (“The use of fines should be
exhausted before resort is made to the costlier sanction of imprisonment.”).
91
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of the simple prescriptions from this literature. It will be helpful
to lay these out before discussing the effects of animus.
First, the prescription to set the punishment severity as high
as possible faces practical, legal, and moral limitations. As a practical matter, it may not be possible to make the punishment severe enough to deter a highly motivated individual from committing a harmful act. In the case of financial penalties, this is the
problem of “judgment-proofness.” More generally, the benefits to
an offender from a prohibited act may be too great to deter her
with punishment. This finds its clearest expression in the case of
a wrongdoer who anticipates dying in the commission of a crime.
Such a person clearly will not be deterred by the death penalty
and may not be deterred by even the more exotic and macabre
punishments that we might dream up. This changes the calculus
of punishment severity. It is one thing to threaten draconian
penalties knowing that one will not have to impose them, but if one
has to actually impose those penalties, then it will generally be optimal to choose something less than the most severe punishment.95
Second, there are legal and moral constraints on punishment
severity that limit the set of feasible punishments. Well-settled
constitutional and moral principles rooted in deeply held notions
of culpability and responsibility limit the severity of punishment
that can be imposed.96
Finally, there are fairness concerns with a sanction regime
that substitutes lower monitoring and policing efforts for more
severe punishments. In such a regime, only a small subset of the
people who commit a particular infraction will be punished, and
they will be punished more harshly than they would need to be if
enforcement were perfect. These unlucky few bear the entire burden of a regulatory scheme meant to deter a vast number of
crimes. This outcome may offend our sense of fairness even if the
likelihood of being punished were not correlated with normatively
arbitrary characteristics of the wrongdoers—such as race and
class—as it is likely to be. Although these ex post inequities in
punishment are irrelevant within an economic framework of socialwelfare maximization, any policy proposal will have to respect
these concerns about inequity in order to be taken seriously as a
practical matter.
95

See id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 689 (2012) (“Because punishment is the community’s formal expression of blame or condemnation through the imposition of sanctions, it
is unjust to impose punishment in the absence of culpability.”).
96
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I have identified some of the economic, moral, and legal considerations that bear on the choice among forms of punishment
and the choice between punishment severity and enforcement efforts. The discussion has been general, and not specific to punishments that depend on the actor’s intentions. In the next Section,
I discuss hate crimes and add to this list of general considerations, some of the objections that have been made to singling hate
crimes out for enhanced punishment.
B. Hate Crimes
Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have statutes
that provide for aggravated sentencing, civil remedies, or both,
for hate crimes.97 Many of these laws, passed in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, cover race, ethnicity, religion, disability, and sexual
orientation. Although there was a lot of optimism about the potential effectiveness of hate-crime statutes in the early years after
their adoption,98 there is little good evidence about their effectiveness.99 Many scholars remain skeptical about the potential of
hate-crime laws,100 due in part to the enforcement challenges that
hate crimes present. Underreporting is a common issue for hate
crimes.101 Hate-crime prosecution is also hindered by the difficulty
of proving hate as a motive.102
Hate-crime statutes typically include enhanced criminal
penalties for bias crimes, but only some include a civil cause of
action—generally to encourage increased reporting.103 However,
civil remedies under these laws have proven difficult to obtain
even when they are technically available.104 The general omission
97

See MICHAEL SHIVELY, STUDY OF LITERATURE AND LEGISLATION ON HATE CRIME
Federal civil rights statutes also punish certain acts motivated
by animus. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 249.
98 See, e.g., Marguerite Angelari, Hate Crime Statutes: A Promising Tool for Fighting
Violence Against Women, 2 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 63, 67 (1994).
99 See SHIVELY, supra note 97, at v (“The impact of hate crime law reform has not
been subject to rigorous evaluation.”).
100 See, e.g., James Morsch, Comment, The Problem of Motive in Hate Crimes: The
Argument Against Presumptions of Racial Motivation, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 659,
660 (1991) (“[S]tate hate crimes statutes have largely failed to address the problem of
racially-motivated violence.”).
101 See, e.g., Sahar Fathi, Bias Crime Reporting: Creating a Stronger Model for Immigrant and Refugee Populations, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 249, 262 (2013) (discussing hate-crime
underreporting in the context of immigrant and refugee communities).
102 Morsch, supra note 100, at 667 (“The fact that an individual’s motive lies peculiarly within his or her knowledge undermines the ability of prosecutors and plaintiffs to
prove racist motive in hate crimes cases.”).
103 See SHIVELY, supra note 97, at 14–15.
104 Id. at 36–37.
IN AMERICA 127–36 (2005).
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of private causes of action for hate-crime laws was due to concerns
about nuisance suits.105 Because of the evidentiary and procedural
hurdles to obtaining damages, the primary tool for deterring hate
crimes remains hard treatment.
Part of the challenge in deterring hate crimes comes from the
fact that animus can have multiple origins. Work by Professors
Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin, and Susan Bennett, has developed a
typology of hate-crime offenders, by identifying four sets of motives for their animus.106 “Thrill seekers” are motivated by the excitement of the crime but choose their victims in part because
they believe that society is in
different to the well-being of
those victims and holds them in low regard.107 “Defenders” believe
that they are protecting spaces or institutions from the threat of
outsiders.108 “Retaliatory offenders” act out in response to perceived harms committed by members of the victim group.109 Finally, “mission offenders” are motivated by ideology, typically racial or religious in nature.110 Deterring individuals with animus
requires a deterrent that answers to these different psychologies.
Setting aside the (unanswered) question of whether hatecrime laws successfully deter anyone, legal scholars have also
questioned the morality of hate-crime legislation. Scholars operating in the retributivist strand of criminal law scholarship must
justify aggravated punishments either in terms of the nature of
the criminal act (i.e., the act itself is made worse by the actor’s
bad intentions) or in terms of the actor’s culpability (i.e., the presence of animus makes the actor more morally blameworthy).
These are controversial positions about which retributivists disagree. For example, Professors Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore argue that enhancements for hate crimes punish people for their
bad character, and that it is wrong to do so.111 They conclude that
there is no compelling moral justification for hate-crime statutes
and no place for such laws in a liberal society.112
105

See Morsch, supra note 100, at 664 n.36, 665 n.43.
Jack McDevitt, Jack Levin & Susan Bennett, Hate Crime Offenders: An Expanded
Typology, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 303, 305–06 (2002).
107 Id. at 305–08.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 306.
110 Id. at 305–09.
111 Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1081, 1135–38 (2004). On whether hate-crime laws punish people for beliefs, see, for
example, Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1015, 1044–45 (1997).
112 Heidi M. Hurd, Why Liberals Should Hate “‘Hate Crime Legislation”, 20 LAW &
PHIL. 215, 231–32 (2001). But see Mohamad Al-Hakim, Making Room for Hate Crime
106
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Other scholars from outside the retributivist camp have offered arguments in support of hate-crime legislation. Professors
Alon Harel and Gideon Parchomovsky ground a justification for
hate-crime legislation in equality and the idea that all persons
are entitled to fair protection by society from criminal conduct.113
They argue that some individuals are more vulnerable to criminal
harms because they are members of targeted classes of persons,
and this greater vulnerability means that the law must provide
greater deterrence for acts that target them.114 From the economics literature, Professors Dhammika Dharmapala and Nuno
Garoupa argue that the penalty enhancements can be justified
within an optimal deterrence framework because the aggregate
social costs of hate crimes can be greater than for ordinary
crimes, even if any individual act may not be made worse by a
hate motive.115
C. Punishments that Fit the Crime
Animus increases the intensity of an actor’s motivation to
commit a harmful act, but it also enlarges the set of tools available for regulating the offender’s conduct. The richer the set of an
individual’s motivations, the more points of leverage that the regulator has over her behavior. In this Section, I describe how a regulator should think about using these points of leverage to enhance deterrence of antisocial behavior.
1. A thwarting approach to deterrence.
Recall that the problem we are concerned with is an actor
who may have more than one objective in committing a harmful
act. In the example above, Michael wants to reestablish a congenial neighborhood aesthetic, but he may also enjoy harming the
church itself. The optimal punishment must make Michael liable
not only for the harm to the church (which is necessary for him to
Legislation in Liberal Societies, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 341, 348–49 (2010) (explaining that the
impermissibility of such laws in liberal societies is overblown).
113 Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE L.J. 507,
532–34 (1999).
114 Id. (arguing for a “fair protection” paradigm that allocates protection in an
egalitarian manner and thereby justifies harsher penalties for hate crimes). Harel
and Parchomovsky’s fair-protection paradigm provides a normative justification for the
solidarity-deterrence scheme that I propose in Part II.C.
115 Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, Penalty Enhancement for Hate Crimes:
An Economic Analysis, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 185, 198–201 (2004). On the politics of hatred—and the role of politicians in fostering it—see generally Edward L. Glaeser, The Political Economy of Hatred, 120 Q.J. ECON. 45 (2005).
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internalize the costs of his actions) but also for the benefits that
he realizes and that society does not honor as a legitimate source
of value—his animus utility.116 The optimal punishment then has
two functions: cost internalization and the deprivation of illegitimate gains.
This second function of the punishment is to thwart Michael
from realizing objectives that society does not honor. If the punishment causes him to disgorge any illicit gains from an action,
then his actions will only be guided by licit gains. There are many
examples where this logic applies. For example, in the federal income tax context, there are a variety of common law doctrines that
are meant to discourage taxpayers from entering into transactions
for the tax benefits that the transaction will generate rather than
for the profitability of the transaction.117 The taxpayer will always
argue that their true purpose for entering into the transaction
was the expectation of profit. By denying the taxpayer outsized
tax deductions of credits, the doctrines ensure that a taxpayer will
only enter into the transaction if, in fact, she expects a pretax
profit.
Or consider trying to deter an actor motivated by religious
animus to burn down a nearby synagogue. If her objective in
burning down the synagogue is to deprive the local Jewish community of common spaces for worship and community building as
well as to cause fear and anxiety, then any response to the action
that has the opposite effect—facilitating community building and
alleviating anxiety and fear—will tend to thwart the actor’s purposes and discourage her from taking that act in the first place.
For example, a collective response to rebuild the synagogue, provide heightened security, and perhaps even make additional investments in upholding and protecting Jewish cultural and religious institutions will tend to deprive the actor’s action of its
efficacy and perhaps even cause it to have a counterproductive
effect, from her perspective.
Alternatively, it could be that the actor’s motive in burning
down the synagogue is malice and that she has a personal grudge
against the members of the synagogue. In the case of malice,
where the actor is concerned not only with the harm to the victim
but also with who the agent of that harm is, then truly thwarting
116 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 247 (providing for heightened penalties against individuals who
deface religious property because of its religious character or obstruct people engaged in
the free exercise of religion using force or the threat of force).
117 See, e.g., Kirchman v. Comm’r, 862 F.2d 1486, 1492 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[T]ransactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are substantive shams.”).
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the actor involves making the actor herself provide benefits to the
members of the synagogue. In that case, a community-based response to an act of vandalism will not thwart the actor. Only a
sanction that requires the actor to be the agent of the Jewish community’s rehabilitation will thwart her.
Thwarting actors with bad motives from acting on those motives means matching the punishment with the crime—not in the
sense of imposing a punishment on the offender that resembles,
in some sense, the nature of the harm borne by the victim, but by
imposing a punishment that disgorges the benefit that the actor
herself obtained from creating the harm. It is no surprise that the
form and size of the punishment should be focused on the actor
and not the victim when the goal is deterrence, since it is the actor’s conduct that we want to control.
By creating a tight connection between the animus motive
and the punishment, a thwarting approach to deterrence not only
creates new points of leverage over perpetrators of hate crimes, it
can help distinguish between crimes motivated by animus and
those with other motives without undertaking costly fact-finding
and meeting high standards of proof. Thwarting punishments
have a “screening” effect, disproportionately and automatically
imposing greater deterrence for people motivated by animus
without proving that such animus exists. Proving the subjective
intent necessary to convict someone of a hate crime has been a
significant obstacle to successful prosecution of hate crimes with
enhanced sentences. Thwarting punishments avoid this problem
because they impose greater harms on people with animus than
people without animus, effectively increasing the punishment for
hate crimes.
Thwarting deterrence can also be effective against people
who do not harbor animus but instead seek the approval of other
people who do. Dharmapala and McAdams argue that some people who commit hate crimes are motivated by the desire to be esteemed by other people who have animus toward vulnerable populations—call them “haters.”118 Such a person might commit a
hate crime because he knows that doing so will cause him to be
held in high regard by the haters. A thwarting punishment will
deter him, too, because he knows that by committing a hate crime
his actions will actually redound to the benefit of the target group,

118 Dhammika Dharmapala & Richard H. McAdams, Words That Kill? An Economic
Model of the Influence of Speech on Behavior (with Particular Reference to Hate Speech),
34 J. LEGAL STUD. 93, 108 (2005).
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having the opposite of the effect desired by the haters and earning
the perpetrator their frustration—rather than their esteem.
Although the simple economic model used in Part II.A to illustrate deterrence of property crime can just as easily be used as
a formal description of the decision to commit a violent crime,
achieving deterrence through thwarting faces a couple of limitations in the context of violent crime that are important to highlight.
First, we may be concerned that violent crimes arise from
emotional reactions rather than sober cost-benefit calculations,
and therefore any scheme of deterrence that relies on people
thinking about the consequences of their actions is likely to fail.
But we need not assume that people actually perform the costbenefit calculations described in the model for deterrence to work,
only that, by being responsive to thwarting in the way we predict,
they behave as if they perform those calculations. In Part II.C.3,
I discuss some of the psychological mechanisms through which
“solidarity deterrence,” in particular, may thwart the desire to
commit acts of animus-based violence.
Second, thwarting logic works by benefiting the object of a
bad actor’s animus. In attempting to deter homicides, this works
only when the true object of the actor’s animus is a class or group
of people. When the actor harbors animus for only one person in
particular, it is not possible to deter homicidal intentions by committing to benefit that person. But when a hate crime is motivated by animus toward a cause or a class of persons represented
by that single person—such as is often the case in hate crimes
where there is no personal connection to the victim—then thwarting is possible.
In the next Section, I explain how damages thwart actors who
act out of animus or malice, and I evaluate damages according to
the economic and moral issues raised in Part II.B.
2. Penalties and damages.
Returning to the example of Michael and the African Methodist
Episcopal church, recall that Michael will destroy the crèche if
𝑏 + 𝛼ℎ > 𝜋𝑃. Suppose that we want to deter him from committing
this act unless the illicit benefits are greater than the harm. We
can ensure this will be the case by setting the punishment 𝑃∗ to
satisfy the following equation:
𝑃∗ =

ℎ(1 + 𝛼)
𝜋
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Setting the punishment at this level requires knowing his animus 𝛼, the magnitude of the harm ℎ, and the probability of arrest
and conviction 𝜋. Although the harm to the church of the destroyed property may be measurable (e.g., the cost of replacing
the crèche), and the probability of conviction can be estimated using data on arrests and convictions, Michael’s animus can only be
determined through a costly process of evidence collection and
discovery. Moreover, the additional prosecutorial burden of having to prove 𝛼 may reduce the likelihood that Michael is convicted,
thereby reducing the probability of conviction and further increasing 𝑃∗ .
It is obvious from the equation for 𝑃∗ that the punishment
must be greater to deter someone motivated by animus than
someone without animus. The question is how much greater? A
small increase in animus increases the punishment necessary to
ℎ
deter them by 𝜋. Thus, when this fraction is large, such as in the
case of very large harms or when there is a small probability of
being punished, even a little bit of animus can have large effects
on the punishment necessary to deter. For example, suppose that
the benefit to Michael of destroying the crèche and the harm he
would cause the church by doing so are both equal to $1,000. Assume that the probability of being punished is 10%. If Michael is
without animus, then a financial penalty of $10,000 will deter
him. If Michael’s animus utility is equal to the harm caused to the
church (that is, 𝛼 equals 1) then the financial penalty necessary
to deter him is $20,000. If he gets twice as much pleasure from
the church’s loss (𝛼 equals 2) then the financial penalty necessary
to deter him is $30,000. As his animus increases, the penalty necessary to deter him spirals upward.
Thus, animus increases the cost of punishment along several
dimensions. First, the optimal punishment requires determining
𝛼, which demands a costly adjudication process. Second, the difficulty of proving 𝛼 may result in decreased probability that someone acting out of animus will be convicted for doing so, reducing
𝜋. Third, both the direct effect of 𝛼 on 𝑃∗ and any indirect effect
that it might have through reducing 𝜋 increase the size of the
punishment necessary to deter Michael. As the punishment necessary to deter him increases, it becomes more likely that 𝑃∗ will
exceed either the defendant’s ability to pay—raising problems of
judgment-proofness—or legal and moral restrictions on maximal punishments, either of which would make it impossible to
impose 𝑃∗ .
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When the optimal punishment cannot be achieved because of
moral, legal, or judgment-proofness constraints, more people will
commit the act and more people will need to be punished. If the
nature of the punishment is imprisonment, these costs can be
substantial. As the optimal punishment increases and bumps up
against its maximal value, it may be necessary to devote more
scarce resources to monitoring and enforcement. Moreover, the
fairness concerns noted above become more acute, as an arbitrary
subset of those who commit a bad act become subject to an especially severe punishment. Thus, the presence of animus will tend
to increase the costs of deterrence and introduce more arbitrariness into the administration of punishment. As the costs of deterrence increase, the amount of wrongdoing will increase and the
people who commit the bad act will be the ones with the greatest
animus.
So far, I have been vague about the nature of the penalty that
is imposed on Michael for his criminal act and, in particular, what
is done with the proceeds from any fine that might be imposed.
This, however, is a crucially important question because the analysis of the optimal punishment changes radically if Michael is assessed a fine that is transferred to the church. This is because
paying the fine helps the very people he intended to harm. If the
fine 𝐷 is collected from Michael and transferred to the church,
then the optimal penalty satisfies the following equation:
ℎ(1 + 𝛼)
𝜋
∗
Now the fine 𝐷 is multiplied by both 1 and the animus parameter 𝛼 because when the fine is transferred to the church, it
becomes the cause of two sources of disutility to Michael: the loss
of wealth from paying the fine and the thwarting of his animus
utility by transferring it to the object of his animus. Note also that
because the term (1 + 𝛼) appears on both sides of the equation it
ℎ
can be divided out, leaving 𝐷 ∗ = . If we compare 𝐷 ∗ with 𝑃∗ using
𝜋
the earlier example, we can generate the same deterrence with a
$10,000 transfer from Michael to the church as we would get by
imposing on him $20,000 of punishment by other means, such as
a fine payable to the government or the monetary equivalent of
hard treatment. In this way, a fine of $1 generates $(1 + 𝛼) dollars
𝐷 ∗ (1 + 𝛼) =
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of deterrence if it is transferred to the object of the actor’s animus.
There is of course a name for such transfers: damages.119
When thinking about deterrence, it is typical to focus just on
the hardships that can be directly imposed on someone to discourage them from bad behavior.120 However, there are hardships that
produce benefits for someone that the offender dislikes, and these
kinds of hardships not only reduce the social costs of punishment
but also multiply the deterrent effect of the hardship.121 This multiplier implies that a smaller amount of damages is required to
achieve the same deterrent effect as a larger fine would. Lowering
the financial penalty needed to deter someone makes it more
likely that deterrence can be achieved in the face of practical, legal, and moral constraints on the maximal penalty, and it reduces
the need to resort to costly monitoring and enforcement or hard
treatment as a way of ensuring deterrence.
A real-world example of this logic in action was the so-called
“People’s Pledge,” adopted by Elizabeth Warren and Scott Brown
in the 2012 Massachusetts Senate race. The two candidates
agreed to pay a penalty equal to one half of any funds spent by
outside groups on television or internet advertising on behalf of
their campaigns. The penalties were paid to a charity of their

119 This is far from a full characterization of the relative costs and benefits of damages
and fines. For other considerations, see, for example, Landes & Posner, supra note 53, at
131. In this Article, I focus on deterrence, rather than social-welfare maximization. Professors Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat adopt a welfarist approach and consider the opposite
case to animus in which the potential wrongdoer suffers some nonlegal harm (rather than
animus benefit) that benefits other people. Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Should Courts
Deduct Nonlegal Sanctions from Damages?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 405–10 (2001). On
their account, the “ideal” damages rule requires subtracting the nonlegal sanction cost
from the amount of damages. Id. at 409.
120 Professor Dan Kahan notes that “for those who commit serious criminal offenses,
the law strongly prefers one form of suffering—the deprivation of liberty—to the near exclusion of all others.” Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 591 (1996). Kahan argues that the unacceptability of alternative sanctions is
“their inadequacy along the expressive dimension of punishment.” Id. at 592. I argue that
the expressive function of solidarity-based deterrence may be an advantage.
121 The benefits of damages in multiplying incentives for actors with animus can be
analogized to other insights in the literature about complementing negative punishments
for bad behavior with positive incentives for good behavior. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar &
Anu Bradford, Reversible Rewards, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 156, 162–63 (2012); Murat C.
Mungan, Rewards Versus Imprisonment, 23 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 432, 454–67 (2021);
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Gerrit De Geest, Carrots, Sticks, and the Multiplication Effect,
26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365, 380–81 (2009); Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 71–73 (1984). Professors Klumpp and Mialon’s
work notes (without discussing) the multiplicative effect of damages. Klumpp & Mialon,
supra note 50, at 56 n.12.
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opponent’s choice.122 The agreement was publicized to outside
groups in a letter from the candidates saying: “Your spending will
damage the candidate you intend to help.”123 The pledge worked
and has been adopted in other electoral races.124 Warren herself
proposed that her opponent in the 2018 Senate race agree to the
same pledge.125
People trying to lose weight or achieve some other goal that
requires overcoming temptation can exploit this multiplicative
deterrent effect using the website stickK.com, founded by Professor Ian Ayres, Jordan Goldberg, and Professor Dean Karlan.126 Financial stakes that a user posts on that website are forfeited if
the participant fails to fulfill some obligation, like stopping smoking or exercising.127 This forfeiture operates like a fine. However,
at the user’s option, the funds can be forfeited to a friend or foe,
to a charity or an “anti-charity.”128 Why would one choose to forfeit
the funds to a foe or a charity with a mission that one strongly
disagrees with? As the website puts it: “Wouldn’t it just kill you to
hand over your hard-earned money to someone you can’t stand?
That’s a pretty strong incentive to achieve your goal now isn’t it?”129
In addition to multiplying the deterrence of a given financial
penalty, damages have another considerable benefit: they automatically calibrate to the degree of the actor’s animus. Recall first
that setting the optimal financial penalty 𝑃∗ requires knowing
how much animus an offender harbors for the victim. The analysis of 𝑃∗ assumed that an offender’s animus could be discovered
by a fact finder but that doing so was costly and subject to error.
Since whether an individual is motivated by animus is unobservable and the individual has every incentive to mislead the fact
finder, direct investigations into intent are costly and fraught.
But note that 𝐷 ∗ does not depend on 𝛼 at all. The reason is
that although the optimal penalty increases with 𝛼, so does the
deterrent effect of paying damages to the victim. An actor who
122 Dan Eggen, Scott Brown, Elizabeth Warren Pledge to Curb Outside Campaign
Spending, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2012), https://perma.cc/7WP8-A88A.
123 Tovia Smith, Warren-Brown Pledge Keeps Attack Ads at Bay, NPR (May 6, 2012),
https://perma.cc/B2U8-MND9.
124 See, e.g., Nik DeCosta-Klipa, Joe Kennedy and Shannon Liss-Riordan Signed a
People’s Pledge. Ed Markey Is Proposing Something Different., BOSTON.COM (Dec. 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/Y6YR-3TQQ.
125 Victoria McGrane, Warren Wants Another ‘People’s Pledge’ Barring Outside Advertising, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/Y8F4-LSKH.
126 About stickK.com, STICKK, https://perma.cc/L6QM-3GH7.
127 FAQ - Commitment Contracts - Stakes, STICKK, https://perma.cc/336A-ENAJ.
128 Id.
129 Id.
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harbors a great deal of animus will especially dislike making payments to her victim, while someone who harbors no animus will
be indifferent about to whom she pays her fine. The same dollar
amount of damages provides a large deterrent to actors with high
values of 𝛼 and less deterrence to actors with low values of 𝛼.
Thus, damages automatically calibrate the deterrent effect to the
magnitude of the actor’s animus. Whereas assigning a longer
prison sentence to someone with more animus requires knowing
how much animus they have, damages do not have this informational requirement. Not having to prove 𝛼 may also increase the
probability of conviction, which can further lower the amount of
damages needed to efficiently deter potential offenders.
This result about the deterrence benefits of damages adds nuance to Judge Posner’s suggestion that damages are generally inadequate as a form of deterrence.130 Judge Posner argues that the
amount of punitive damages needed to provide optimal deterrence can be very large, taking into account the probability that
the defendant will be found liable.131 This is certainly true, but
when an actor is motivated by animus, damages have a greater
deterrent effect than a fine or hard treatment imposing the same
nominal cost. This is not to say that damages will always be adequate as a deterrent. For sufficiently large harms, legal, moral,
and judgment-proofness constraints may still be limiting and
there will be a role for imprisonment. However, damages, including punitive damages, can play a role in a suite of instruments that
discourage hate crimes and other conduct motivated by animus.132
How do damages hold up to philosophical criticisms about enhanced penalties for hate crimes? Although the amount of damages 𝐷 ∗ is independent of the actor’s animus, the disutility of paying that amount of damages does vary with an actor’s animus.
Paying a specified amount of damages is more unpleasant to an
actor who has animus for the victim than an actor who does not.
Does this mean that paying damages violates a principle of proportionality or basic fairness because it punishes people as a function of their character, which may be outside of their control? A
full treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this Article,
but it must begin by answering the question of what would be

130

Posner, supra note 16, at 1201–05.
Id. at 1203; see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages,
113 YALE L.J. 347, 367 (2003).
132 Historically, tort damages have played a greater role in controlling crime. Posner,
supra note 16, at 1203 (“Primitive and ancient societies . . . have relied much more heavily
than has our society on a form of tort damages.”).
131
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required for a punishment not to vary with the offender’s character. As explained above, the obligation to pay a specified amount
of damages will impose greater harm on individuals with more
animus. Does fairness then require that individuals with more
animus pay less in damages? This is a counterintuitive conclusion, to say the least. If we reject this view and accept instead that
the amount of damages should be fixed, then damages can both
satisfy moral conditions of proportionality and fairness and provide greater deterrence for actors harboring more animus.
The example of damages illustrates the benefits of paying
close attention to the plural motivations that people have when
trying to deter them. For people motivated by animus, it is worth
considering not just the harm that can be directly imposed on
them but also the ways that we treat the objects of their animus.
As I explain in the next Section, focusing on the well-being of victims as a point of leverage over offenders with animus does not
just highlight the relative superiority of damages over fines, it
suggests the possibility of alternative regulation mechanisms
that eliminate the judgment-proofness concern entirely.
3. Solidarity deterrence.
On November 15, 2014, neo-Nazis marched through the
streets of Wunsiedel, Germany.133 They were greeted with placards thanking them for their presence.134 This was not because
the residents of the small town were sympathetic to them, but
because the residents had pledged to make financial contributions to deradicalize former neo-Nazis for every meter the neoNazis walked.135 The idea for the “involuntary walkathon” comes
from the Center for Democratic Culture in Germany (ZDK
Deutschland), which started Rechts Gegen Rechts (Right Against
Right), “the most involuntary charity in Germany.” 136 There is no
conclusive evidence on the efficacy of these organized community
responses, but they do appear to vex the organizers of the
marches. A representative of ZDK Deutschland who follows the
online platforms where neo-Nazis gather notes that “we see that

133 Elena Cresci, German Town Tricks Neo-Nazis into Raising Thousands of Euros for
Anti-extremist Charity, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://perma.cc/KT9T-K6YS.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Elissa Stolman, German Activists Are Trolling Anti-immigrant Groups, VICE (Dec.
12, 2015), https://perma.cc/B27R-CYM5.
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the neo-Nazis see our actions, discuss them, and think about how
to handle it. I think they have no idea how to combat our actions.”137
Return to the case of Michael. If a community group, or the
local government, responded to his act of violence by compensating the people that he intended to harm, how much would that
compensation need to be to deter him? If he values the well-being
of the church according to the parameter 𝛼, the transfer 𝑇 will
need to satisfy the following equation:
𝛼𝑇 ∗ =

ℎ(1 + 𝛼)
𝜋
ℎ(1+𝛼)

Alternatively, we can write that 𝑇 ∗ =
. We can now com𝜋𝛼
pare the amount of the community transfer with the amount of
damages and the amount of a fine that would be needed to deter
Michael. The transfer 𝑇 ∗ is larger than the damages 𝐷 ∗; however,
𝑇 ∗ may be larger or smaller than the fine 𝑃∗ . Community transfers to his victims and monetary fines are two different ways of
punishing Michael, and each of them generates different amounts
of disutility. If Michael hates the members of the church more
than he values his own self-interest, then it will be cheaper to
deter him by helping the church. If he cares more about himself
than he dislikes the church members, it will be cheaper to deter
him with a fine than with a community transfer.
Like fines—but unlike damages—the optimal community
transfer depends on knowing 𝛼. This reintroduces the costliness
of ascertaining intent as a factor in deciding between community
transfers and damages. However, note that as the actor’s animus
increases to very high levels, 𝑇 ∗ is equal to 𝐷 ∗ and it is no longer
necessary to know 𝛼 to set the optimal transfer. So, a community
ℎ
transfer of 𝜋 can deter people who are single-minded and care only
about imposing harm on the affected group. On the other hand,
community deterrence does not deter individuals acting out of
malice. Malice is thwarted only when the actor herself helps the
victim, so solidarity-based deterrence works for animus but not
malice.
In the remainder of this Section, I describe in general terms
how a scheme of community-based solidarity deterrence involving
a transfer of 𝑇 ∗ could deter acts from animus. I will describe the
scheme in isolation, as though it were the only tool used for deterrence, but such a scheme could supplement other deterrence
137

Id.
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measures such as fines, damages, and incarceration—all of which
might vindicate values other than those bolstered by the solidaritydeterrence scheme.
The idea behind solidarity-deterrence schemes is as follows.
Whenever a harmful act motivated by animus is committed, prosecuted, and convicted, a monetary transfer from a “solidarity”
fund is transferred to the victims or the class of persons that are
the objects of the actor’s animus. To the extent possible, the transfer should be directed to support and enhance the values, institutions, and concerns that that actor was motivated to harm. For
example, consider the mass shooting on August 3, 2019, at a
Walmart in El Paso, Texas.138 The shooter appears to have been
motivated by an anti-immigrant ideology.139 In this case, the
transfer from the solidarity fund could be used to aid Central
American migrants by increasing access to legal services for immigration or providing income and social services support. If the
shooter’s purpose was to reduce the number of Central American
immigrants in Texas, a more narrowly tailored response to
thwarting his animus would involve transferring resources to increase the number of Central American migrants.
Properly calibrated, the solidarity scheme would be adequate
to deter acts of animus and no transfers would ever have to be
made. However, for the transfer scheme to be credible and to provide a salient deterrent, the solidarity fund should be funded in
advance and perhaps be financed with a separate devoted revenue stream.140 To deter all hate crimes the fund would need to be
sufficiently large to deter the acts that impose the most harm on
vulnerable groups and for which wrongdoers have the lowest likelihood of being apprehended and convicted.141 For very large
harms or crimes that are difficult to prosecute, this amount could
be quite large. Therefore, a trade-off exists between the social
costs of hate crimes and the cost of raising the funds to credibly
deter them.
a) Collusion. The fact that compensation under solidarity
deterrence comes from the community at large, rather than the
offender, creates the incentive for collusion between the offender
138

Romo, supra note 6.
Id.
140 It is important that the effects of the transfer fund be salient to potential wrongdoers. Aaron Chalfin & Justin McCrary, Criminal Deterrence: A Review of the Literature,
55 J. ECON. LITERATURE 5, 38 (2017) (“Overall, the evidence [on criminal deterrence] suggests that individuals respond to the incentives that are the most immediate and salient.”).
141 The minimum transfer is h, which is greater than the amount of harm itself and
π
therefore will confer a windfall on the victim or victim class.
139
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and the victims of the putative animus-based harm. For example,
suppose that Michael’s community has adopted solidarity deterrence. If Michael is sympathetic to the church members but he is
able to convince a fact finder that he harbors animus for them
instead, then he could commit a harmful act against the church
that would trigger the solidarity fund disbursement, in which
case both he and the members of the church would benefit at the
expense of the community.
This possibility raises the stakes for the fact finder’s determination of Michael’s animus. Moreover, the availability of funds to
support vulnerable individuals or groups may also place pressure
on jurors to make a finding of animus in potential hate-crime circumstances or encourage prosecutors to charge individuals under
hate-crime statutes. The adjudication of these claims will be a
costly and imperfect process, but these costs must be weighed
against the benefits of deterring what might otherwise be undeterrable crimes.
b) Group punishment and matters of fairness. There is a
natural comparison to be made between solidarity deterrence and
group punishment. Under solidarity deterrence, everyone suffers
a little (by financing the solidarity fund) to provide compensation
to the victims of animus harms. Under group punishment, a collection of people is punished even if they are not culpable under
conventional criminal law standards.142 The threat of group punishment is generally justified by the claim that members of the
group are in a position to monitor and discourage wrongdoing by
people with whom they are in close proximity,143 but the practice
is controversial and fundamentally at odds with retributivism.
Nevertheless, group punishment has historical precedents and is
used even now in certain circumstances.144
Professor Daryl Levinson has argued that “the optimal target
of liability is not [always] the wrongdoing injurer but rather some
142 See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with the
Guilty: The Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 88–
96 (2007) (analyzing when group punishment is efficient).
143 Id. at 99–100.
144 This approach is adopted by the Israeli Defense Force through the punitive destruction of the homes of Palestinian suicide bombers. Efraim Benmelech, Claude Berrebi
& Esteban F. Klor, Counter-Suicide-Terrorism: Evidence from House Demolitions, 77 J.
POL. 27, 29 (2015). The deterrent effect of such policies is controversial, with some arguing
that the net effect of punishing innocent individuals to deter bad actors only results in
more terror incidents. Id. at 30. For evidence that such policies can deter terrorist activities, see id. at 33–35. The possibility of harming innocent individuals to achieve some other
end brings into sharp relief the difference between consequentialist and deontological
moral theories. I do not attempt to resolve those differences here.
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other individual, institution, or group that is well situated to monitor and control the wrongdoer’s behavior and can be motivated to
do so by the threat of ‘indirect’ liability.”145 He gives as an example
the tragic use of this tactic in World War II, during which the Nazis confronted resisters in occupied territories who were willing
to die or be tortured for their cause and responded by imposing
collective punishment on the civilian population in order to compel submission from resisters.146 Levinson observes that “insurgents had to bear the moral costs of their acts of resistance. Willingness to sacrifice one’s own life to the cause was one thing;
willingness to sacrifice the lives of one’s countrymen, neighbors,
and family was another.”147 Professor Sarah Swan has analyzed
the related concept of “conjugal liability.”148 She describes onestrike policies in public housing, which result in the eviction of
families for the acts of individual members.149 The idea behind the
ordinances is to provide “maximum incentives to tenants to prevent, discover, and remedy’ the drug or criminal issues of household members.”150 “In general, conjugal liability is meant to harness the potential of one spouse to serve as a source of discipline
for the other.”151
But the group punishment analogy is not a close one. Solidarity deterrence is more efficient than group punishment. First,
whereas group punishment collects resources from the community to impose costly punishment on a subgroup, solidarity-based
deterrence collects resources from the group to benefit a subgroup. Thus, the solidarity scheme has lower social costs—which
only involves monetary transfers—than group punishment,
which imposes hard treatment. Moreover, solidarity deterrence
can be justified to people who pay into the fund but are not generally victims of hate crimes from a contractarian perspective. No
one knows from behind the veil of ignorance whether they are
likely to be the object of animus on the basis of identity characteristics. And there already appears to be some appetite for

145 Daryl J. Levinson, Aimster and Optimal Targeting, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1148,
1148 (2007).
146 Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 409 (2003).
147 Id. On the effectiveness of collective reprisals, see id. at 409–10.
148 Sarah L. Swan, Conjugal Liability, 64 UCLA L. REV. 968, 1019–36 (2017).
149 Id. at 1002–04.
150 Sarah Swan, Home Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 847 (2015) (quoting Reply Brief for
Dep’t of Hous. and Urb. Dev. at 12, Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125
(2002) (No. 00-1770)).
151 Swan, supra note 148, at 1021 (citing Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2012)).
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providing social insurance to the victims of hateful acts. Consider, for example, the taxpayer-funded September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund.152 Second, in terms of basic fairness, although
it is arguably true that the beneficiaries of the solidarity fund are
being used instrumentally to deter the animus-motivated actor,
the fact that the group is being made better-off takes some of the
teeth out of this concern. The group is only being used for the purpose of deterring animus harms against itself.
c) Public vs. private action. Providing public solidaritybased deterrence for religious groups would likely run into constitutional challenges. Could private individuals organize to fund a
similar scheme that would not implicate state action? Happily, it
is common enough for regular citizens to respond to episodes of
animus-based violence by making contributions of money, time,
and resources to support the communities affected by these
acts.153 If private citizens already do this, is it necessary to have a
compulsory government transfer scheme? Will solidarity-deterrence
regimes crowd out these private actions? If they do, is that a bad
thing?
The spontaneous outpouring of public support that happens
in the wake of hate crimes differs from solidarity deterrence.
First, a solidarity regime’s purpose is deterrence. Private sentiments of support for victims of animus crimes are complex but
generally include a desire to compensate or console—however imperfectly—the victims rather than serve as a means of deterring
future acts of animus. This distinction is important because if the
purpose of the support is compensation, then the form of compensation will take its cues from the preferences of the victims. In
many cases, such as where the effect of an animus crime is death,
private transfers will be incommensurable with the harm borne
by the victims. If the goal of the transfers is deterrence, however,
then the form of the transfers must depend on the preferences of
the wrongdoer, which may allow for greater commensurability between the transfers and the underlying harms. Without agreement on purpose, it is unlikely that spontaneous community
transfers will be calibrated in form or magnitude to deter potential offenders.

152 For a description, see September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, SEPTEMBER
11TH VICTIM COMP. FUND, https://perma.cc/4LWD-PNNB.
153 See, e.g., National Center for Victims of Crime, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
https://perma.cc/U2NU-U8XC; Victim Connect Resource Center, VICTIMCONNECT,
https://perma.cc/J2BV-YDCM.
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For example, suppose that Smith, motivated by animus
against migrant workers, murders three such workers. The lives
of those three particular people will be irreplaceable to the people
who loved them. On the other hand, Smith may have been quite
indifferent about precisely whom he murdered, so long as they
shared the trait of being migrant workers. Indeed, recent highprofile hate crimes seem to have this characteristic, whereby
there is no personal animosity between the wrongdoer and the
victim. The only reason that the victims were targeted was because they were members of a class that was the object of the animus. In such cases, it may be possible to match the solidaritybased response with the harm intended by the wrongdoer. If
Smith’s aim is to reduce the number of migrant workers, then
providing resources to support any migrant worker or facilitate
the entry of more migrant workers as a result of Smith’s crime
will thwart his intentions, generating a deterrent that is commensurable with his intended harm.
There are other reasons to think that solidarity deterrence
will be more effective than spontaneous private outpourings of
support.154 The first is predictability. Private support for victims
of animus-based harms varies depending on idiosyncratic features of the harm, such as how the harms are reported in the media and how sympathetically the victims are viewed. The same
animosity that motivated the harm may exist, in a more muted
form, in the population at-large so that private transfers may be
more limited when the victims are marginalized minority groups.
The social meaning of solidarity transfers is also different
than private, spontaneous transfers. Because the focus of solidarity deterrence is on the wrongdoer, transfers to targeted individuals or groups are made instrumentally to deter actors motivated
by animus. The entire scheme is based on the view that it is wrong
to target individuals or members of a group for harm out of animus. For this reason, solidarity-deterrence schemes express social disapproval of animus-based harm. They single out for special
condemnation the particular wrong of desiring to harm a victim
not because it is instrumental to achieving another end but because of a bare desire to harm that victim.155 In the same way that

154 Private donations can have mixed effects on communities that have been affected
by tragedy. Elizabeth Williamson, A Lesson of Sandy Hook: ‘Err on the Side of the Victims’,
N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/WPN8-LJ3W.
155 Some scholars disagree that this bare desire to harm is either necessary or sufficient to make an action wrong. See, e.g., DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION
WRONG? 139 (2008).
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discriminatory public statements might create expressive harms
through what they suggest about the unequal status of persons in
society, solidarity-based deterrence may have expressive value
both as a communication about fundamental equality before the
law and as a manifestation of civic solidarity against animus.
This expressive function of solidarity deterrence may have its
own, independent, deterrent effect. As discussed in Part II.B,
many perpetrators of hate crimes are motivated, in part, by the
belief that society approves of their actions. Thrill seekers tend to
choose their victims because they believe that society does not
value them equally with others, and defenders believe that, in
committing hate crimes, they are simply doing what others are
too afraid to do. A public deterrence scheme, funded at some cost
by the community, has the potential to be a salient repudiation of
these views.
Individuals motivated by hate would seem to be the hardest
to deter. From an economic perspective, this strong motivation for
antisocial behavior will generally raise the cost of regulating their
behavior. However, the presence of animus also provides another
point of leverage over their conduct. By helping the people that
the bad actor intends to harm, it may be possible to deter such
bad actors. An analysis of the animus motive reveals that damages
may have an underappreciated role in deterring bad actors, both
because they multiply the deterrent effect of penalties and because
they automatically calibrate to the amount of the bad actor’s animus. Acknowledging animus opens the door to a novel solidaritydeterrence scheme, under which the wrongdoer’s aims are
thwarted by a community response to advance the interests of the
group that the wrongdoer intends to harm.
III. UNCONSTITUTIONAL ANIMUS
Although the reach of law and economics is long, some of the
most important constitutional questions of the day—such as
those surrounding religious freedom, voting rights, or the equal
protection of minorities—have been mostly beyond its grasp.156 As
a result, law and economics has been largely silent on the

156 This is, of course, not to say that there have not been important contributions by
law and economics scholars to the study of constitutions, such as those coming out of the
public-choice tradition. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 63–84 (1962). For a
more contemporary example analyzing state constitutions, see Robert D. Cooter & Michael
D. Gilbert, A Theory of Direct Democracy and the Single Subject Rule, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
687, 712–20 (2010).
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questions associated with some of the deepest fault lines in law
and politics. Perhaps this is as it should be. Law and economics
scholarship has historically been guided by the totalizing goal of
wealth maximization, which solves difficult questions about the
ranking and commensurability of different values by ignoring
their differences. It is unsurprising, then, that in the realm of constitutional debate, where battles are fought over the fundamental
principles for ordering society, enthusiasm for subsuming all of
those concerns under the umbrella of wealth maximization has
been muted.
But even in constitutional law, economic analysis can play a
useful role as a servant rather than as a master. Economics qua
social science asks: Given a set of objectives, what is the most efficient way of achieving those objectives and how can legal institutions be designed to account for the incentives and constraints
that individuals face?157 As an analyst, the economist takes society’s goals as she finds them and puts economic reasoning and
empirical methods to use in helping the lawmaker achieve those
goals.158
In this Part, I use economics in this “servant” tradition. In
particular, I focus on how the difficulties associated with determining whether government acts were motivated by animus can
be resolved using a law and economics–based approach.159 I do not
attempt to explain whether constitutional prohibitions on certain
discriminatory lawmaking help maximize social wealth or social
welfare (I don’t know if they do). Neither do I evaluate whether
animus should be a feature of constitutional equal protection
analysis.160 Instead, I take as given that government acts are constitutionally suspect if they are motivated by the desire to harm
157 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 3–7 (1953) (describing the framework of normative economics as
opposed to positive economics).
158 In related work, I describe how facts-and-circumstances tests should be structured
so that courts can draw credible inferences from the evidence. See generally Andrew T.
Hayashi, A Theory of Facts and Circumstances, 69 ALA. L. REV. 289 (2017).
159 For an example of legal scholarship analyzing whether a particular piece of legislation was motivated by animus without using a law and economics model, see Katherine
A. Macfarlane, Procedural Animus, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1185, 1206–18 (2020) (arguing that
animus motivated the Prison Litigation Reform Act).
160 For an overview of the role of intentions in constitutional doctrine, see generally
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV.
523 (2016); Calvin R. Massey, The Role of Governmental Purpose in Constitutional Judicial Review, 59 S.C. L. REV. 1 (2007); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997). For a history of judicial review of forbidden
purposes, see Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1784, 1795–1859 (2008).
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some group of people, and I use economic analysis to provide insights to distinguish between laws motivated by animus and
those with a legitimate public purpose.
Animus is only one of several illegitimate government purposes. Others include racial balancing161 and excluding a category
of persons because they are presumed to be inferior.162 But animus
is different, resembling a motive more than an intention. Scholarship on forbidden legislative intentions has tried to distinguish
between intentions, purposes, and motives. Professor Richard
Fallon, for example, argues that bad legislative intentions (which
are directed at the proximate goal of the law) have constitutional
implications but that motives (which relate to the values that the
goal vindicates) do not, except as far as these motivations inform
intentions or act as evidence of intentions.163 Yet animus does
have constitutional significance.
A. The Equal Protection Significance of Animus
In this Section, I describe the relevance of animus in equal
protection jurisprudence.164 Understanding exactly what animus
means in that context and how it operates to invalidate government actions is necessary to implement an economic approach
that maps to the doctrine. Unfortunately, the doctrinal significance of animus as a motive for government action remains ambiguous even as it has increased in importance in recent years.165
161 See, e.g., Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 (1978) (holding that
using racial quotas violates the Fourteenth Amendment); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
920 (1995) (“Race was . . . the predominant, overriding factor explaining the General
Assembly’s decision to attach to the Eleventh District various appendages containing
dense majority-black populations. As a result, Georgia’s congressional redistricting plan
cannot be upheld unless it satisfies strict scrutiny.” (citing Johnson v. Miller, 864 F. Supp.
1354, 1372, 1378 (S.D. Ga. 1994))).
162 See, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982) (“Thus, if the
statutory objective is to exclude or ‘protect’ members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate.” (quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–85 (1973) (plurality
opinion))).
163 Fallon, supra note 160, at 536.
164 The framework is relevant in other areas of constitutional law where intent matters, such as First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct.
at 1729; Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 427–32 (1996) (defining “impermissible motive” in the context of First Amendment jurisprudence).
165 See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Windsor, Animus, and the Future of Marriage Equality,
113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 204, 208 (2013) (“[T]he concept is inherently enigmatic, as
the Court itself has yet to present a unified theory of animus. Rather, the Court’s precedent presents a shifting, incomplete portrait.”). Courts have sometimes downplayed evidence of animus, and, in the employment discrimination context, such evidence is
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We can contrast the effect of animus with the effect of discriminatory intent. Facially discriminatory laws are evaluated
using the “tiers of scrutiny” approach.166 Under this approach,
laws are subject to more rigorous review depending on the nature
of the discriminatory classification. Laws that discriminate on the
basis of race,167 religion,168 national origin,169 or alienage,170 are
subject to “strict scrutiny,” which requires that the law be narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.171
Discriminatory laws that classify on the basis of gender172 or birth
legitimacy173 are subject to “intermediate scrutiny,” which requires that the law be substantially related to the furtherance of
an important government interest.174 Laws that provide for differential treatment on the basis of other classifications are given “rational basis” review, which requires only that the law be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.175
In the case of laws subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny,
the burden of proving constitutionality is assigned to the government.176 Under rational basis review, constitutionality is presumed, and the plaintiff must disprove all legitimate justifications for the law, regardless of the actual motivations for
enactment.177
Since Washington v. Davis,178 courts will entertain equal protection challenges to laws that are facially neutral only if they
have a discriminatory effect and the discriminatory effect was intended.179 The Supreme Court has since clarified that proving this
sometimes precluded under the “stray remarks doctrine.” See Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit
Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523–24 (2018).
166 Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement Problem:
The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157, 157 (2012).
167 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
168 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), abrogated by Emp. Div., Dep’t.
of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
169 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948).
170 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971).
171 See id. at 375–76 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).
172 See Miss. Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724.
173 See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1982).
174 See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
175 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 565–
66 (5th ed. 2015). The tiers of scrutiny have been criticized for being overly determinative
of the outcome. Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 206–07.
176 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 175, at 699.
177 See Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 207 n.18 (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 314–15 (1993)).
178 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
179 See id. at 239. For a critical analysis of Davis, see Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L.
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prong of an equal protection challenge requires showing that the
adverse impact on a protected class was motivationally significant for the government actor and not just an incidental consequence.180 If an official act was motivated by discriminatory intent, then the facially neutral law with discriminatory effects is
subjected to the same scrutiny as if it were facially discriminatory. This holding places the heavy burden of proving subjective
intent on would-be plaintiffs, sharply limiting the availability of
relief for laws with “merely” discriminatory effect.181
Whereas discriminatory intent subjects a facially neutral law
to heightened scrutiny, the legal significance of animus is murkier. Even as animus has grown in prominence in recent Court
opinions,182 fundamental questions are unresolved183 due to uncertainty about: (1) how to define animus, (2) what counts as evidence of animus, and (3) the doctrinal effect of animus.184 I will
refer to these as the definitional question, the evidentiary question, and the doctrinal question.185
One of the narrowest definitions of animus is that it is “a form
of malicious, subjective intent.”186 In United States Department of
Agriculture v. Moreno,187 the Court articulated the significance of

REV. 36, 40, 111–14 (1977) (“I will propose the following principle: regardless of the motives underlying official action, the equal protection clause requires special scrutiny of
governmental acts resulting in disproportionate impact whenever such impact is reasonably attributable to race.”). See generally Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494 (2003) (exploring the question of
whether Equal Protection jurisprudence precludes the constitutionality of Title VII when
an action is grounded solely on disparate impact). Professor Daniel Ortiz has argued that
intent primarily functions in equal protection analysis to allocate the burden of proof between the state and private actors. Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,
41 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1118–19 (1989).
180 See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 278–79 (1979). For a summary
of disparate impact jurisprudence, see generally Reva B. Siegel, Race-Conscious but RaceNeutral: The Constitutionality of Disparate Impact in the Roberts Court, 66 ALA. L. REV.
653 (2015).
181 See Ortiz, supra note 179, at 1111–15.
182 See Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 210 (“[A]nimus is alive and well and is poised to
increase in importance in the pantheon of equal protection arguments.”).
183 For more on animus in constitutional doctrine, see generally Leslie Kendrick &
Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133 (2018); and WILLIAM
D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW (2017).
184 Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 208–10.
185 Professor Pollvogt provides her own answers to these three questions. Susannah
W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 924–30 (2012). On the
evidentiary question, “[t]he cases instruct that there are essentially two methods: by pointing to direct evidence of private bias in the legislative record, or by supporting an inference
of animus based on the structure of a law.” Id. at 926.
186 Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 209 (citing Pollvogt, supra note 185, at 924–25).
187 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
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legislative animus in this way:188 “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at
the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a
politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”189
This definition of animus suggests the absence of any principled reason—only a “bare desire”—to disfavor or harm the affected group. This narrow interpretation of animus considerably
limits its legal relevance because there will typically be reasons—
however unpersuasive or idiosyncratic they may be—other than
irrational prejudice for disfavoring a group. A broader definition
of animus allows for motives other than mere prejudice, including
animus arising from moral disapproval or fear. The distinction
between these narrower and broader definitions of animus is subtle—too subtle to capture within an economic model. But the difference is important as a political and rhetorical matter. If animus is understood to derive solely from bigotry or hatred, then it
becomes difficult for the Court to invoke it because doing so accuses public officials of immorality.190
The subjective nature of animus raises difficult evidentiary
problems. Proving the presence of animus has historically invited
courts to look for direct statements of hostility or bias by legislators but also to draw an inference of animus from the structure
and function of the law.191 For example, in Romer v. Evans,192 the
Court inferred the presence of animus from the overly broad nature of the law and did not find credible the legitimate justifications offered by Colorado in defense of the law.193
One might hope that proof (however obtained) of animus
(however defined) would have predictable consequences within
equal protection analysis, but even this doctrinal question has not
been resolved. It seems clear that a law motivated only by animus

188 Chief Justice John Roberts adopted the subjective intent definition in United
States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). In searching for malice in the adoption of the
Defense of Marriage Act, he could not conclude that the “‘principal purpose’ of the 342
Representatives and 85 Senators who voted for it, and the President who signed it, was a
bare desire to harm.” Windsor, 570 U.S. at 776 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted)
(quoting id. at 772 (majority opinion)).
189 Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534 (emphasis in original).
190 See Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 211.
191 See id. at 211–12.
192 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
193 Id. at 632 (“[The law’s] sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it
affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.”).
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is unconstitutional, but beyond that the picture is murky.194 In
Lawrence v. Texas,195 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote in concurrence that when a law “exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a more searching form of
rational basis review to strike down such laws,”196 what has been
called rational basis with “bite.”197
United States v. Windsor,198 a case about the constitutionality
of the federal Defense of Marriage Act, was not a case explicitly
about legislative animus, but many commentators view it as an
animus case.199 Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy
wrote that “the federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”200 Professor William Araiza notes that
this allowed Justice Kennedy to avoid answering the question:
“To what extent and by what mechanism does a legitimate motive
cleanse a law of the taint of animus?”201
The Court has not yet answered this question, and scholars
have offered their own conclusions. Professor Susannah Pollvogt
argues that animus operates as a silver bullet that is necessarily
fatal to a law and that “poisons the well” from which states may
draw legitimate purposes in defense of the challenged law.202 Araiza—tracing the roots of animus doctrine back to the Founding
and especially to nineteenth-century anticlass legislation jurisprudence—argues that the presence of animus should be a fatal
constitutional defect, although he does not think that the law has
gone this far yet.203 Professor Dale Carpenter argues that a law
should not be struck down on account of animus unless the animus “materially influenced” the government’s decision.204

194 See Richard C. Schragger, Of Crosses and Confederate Monuments: A Theory of
Unconstitutional Government Speech, 63 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 62 (2021) (“Contemporary equal
protection doctrine appears to disqualify government acts that are motivated solely by
animus.”).
195 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
196 Id. at 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
197 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court:
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1972).
198 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
199 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013
SUP. CT. REV. 183, 231–32 (2014); ARAIZA, supra note 183, at 65–75.
200 Windsor, 570 U.S. at 775.
201 ARAIZA, supra note 183, at 72.
202 Pollvogt, supra note 165, at 889, 904.
203 ARAIZA, supra note 183, at 11–28, 107, 109.
204 Carpenter, supra note 199, at 231–32.
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In light of the definitional, evidentiary, and doctrinal ambiguities around animus in constitutional law, a precise mapping of
law to an economic account is not possible. I offer instead an economic approach to animus that does not simply implement the
doctrine—which is, after all, unclear—but that incorporates some
of the doctrine’s most important features while taking the ambiguity as license to provide a positive account that answers some
of the open questions. My account assumes that courts do not
want legislatures, conceptualized as a single corporate body, to
act in a way that is consistent with affording a class of persons
less regard or respect than others. The account suggests a simple
mechanism for proving the absence of animus in the case of discriminatory laws, and it facilitates a flexible doctrinal role for animus that allows it to operate as either a fatal constitutional flaw
or as a defeasible objection to the law that can be overcome by
sufficient, legitimate government purposes.
B. Statement of the Problem
I begin by stating the animus problem in economic terms, and
then explain how my formulation of the problem maps onto current animus doctrine. As discussed above, there is a lack of clarity
about what exactly that doctrine is, and so my contribution in this
Part is both to formulate the problem in a way that captures
much of what is wrong with animus, while also providing a partial solution.
Consider a law that allocates some fixed public benefit, such
as an appropriation for food stamps, between two groups 𝑖 and 𝑗
in the amounts 𝑓𝑖 and 𝑓𝑗 . Suppose that the two groups are already
endowed with wealth in the amounts 𝑤𝑖 and 𝑤𝑗 .Congress’s preferences about how to allocate the food stamps are given by the
utility function:
𝑢(𝑓𝑖 , 𝑤𝑖 ) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(𝑓𝑗 , 𝑤𝑗 ) + 𝑏(𝑓𝑖 − 𝑓𝑗 ).
Congress cares about the utility of each group, but it assigns
weight (1 − 𝛼) to the utility of group 𝑗. If 𝛼 is greater than 0, then
group 𝑗 is valued less than group 𝑖, and I say that Congress has
animus for group 𝑗.205 Suppose that Congress also derives some
205 Note that this formalism captures the idea that Congress values one group less
than another. One way of thinking about animus here, which doesn’t track the doctrine
perfectly, is that it fails Ronald Dworkin’s “equal concern and respect” treatment by government officials. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 273 (1977). For the most
well-known articulation of the central role of legislative intent or prejudice for equal protection norms, see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
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benefit 𝑏 from a law that allocates more food stamps to group 𝑖
than group 𝑗. For example, this benefit could be reduced administrative or compliance costs resulting from imposing more stringent access limitations on group 𝑗. In general, this benefit represents any legitimate government purpose accompanying
inequality in the allocation of food stamps.206 Congress will allocate more food stamps to group 𝑖 if there are either legitimate administrative benefits from doing so or if they harbor animus for
group 𝑗. This is the crux of the problem. A court reviewing a law
that creates an unequal allocation of food stamps cannot tell
whether it is due to a legitimate government purpose or animus.
The court would like to discourage legislation that creates inequality deriving from animus but not inequality with a legitimate purpose.207 Congress can either allocate food stamps equally
between groups 𝑖 and 𝑗—in which case the law will not be subject
to an equal protection challenge—or choose its most preferred allocation of food stamps.
This model assumes that Congress and the courts are concerned with the overall well-being of groups 𝑖 and 𝑗 and not the
allocation of food stamps itself. However, there may be circumstances in which Congress harbors animus toward one group with
respect to only one kind of good. For example, access to the legal
institution of marriage may be allocated unequally because, for
reasons of moral disapproval, the weight that is given to the enjoyment of marriage rights by certain groups is less than the
weight given to others. I discuss this possibility at greater length
in Part III.C; but for now it suffices to say that this difference does
not affect Congress’s preferred allocation of the good, but it will
affect the best way to discourage legislative animus.
It is important at this point to connect the formal setup of the
problem to the discussion of the constitutional role of animus
given in Part III.A. I begin with the definitional question. By formalizing animus with the parameter 𝛼, I have given it motivational significance, so this is an account of animus based on subjective intent, but only of a sort. Note that the actor whose

REVIEW 135–45 (1980). A special case of this, which corresponds to the definition of animus
used in Part II, is where Congress desires to harm group 𝑗 and is captured by 𝛼 > 1. The
screening logic that motivates the rest of the Article does not change in this special case.
206 The allocation of food stamps that maximizes Congress’s utility satisfies the following condition: 1 − 𝛼 =
207

𝑢𝑓 (𝑓𝑖 ,𝑤𝑖 )+2𝑏
𝑢𝑓 (𝑓𝑗 ,𝑤𝑗 )

.

This approach tracks the judgment of the Court in Windsor. 570 U.S. at 772 (invalidating a federal statute whose “principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other
reasons like governmental efficiency”).
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objectives are described by the utility function above was described as Congress. Corporate bodies can take actions, but can
they have preferences, intentions, and motives?
I think that the answer is no, but the question is contested,
and fortunately economics allows us to be agnostic on that point
(which I discuss in greater detail in Part III.D). There are two approaches to preferences in microeconomics.208 The first approach
treats preferences as real things that motivate choices. If these
preferences have certain normatively desirable properties then
the preference relation can be represented by a utility function.209
The “preferences” of a corporate entity—and now we are no longer
speaking about mental states—might then be understood as the
result of individual preferences processed through some method
of aggregation, such as a voting procedure. Although the preferences of the corporate body would find their origin in the preferences and motivations of the constituent members, the relationship between individual preferences and the preferences of the
corporate entity is likely to be unpredictable.210 The second approach begins with the choices of the actor. If the choices of that
actor satisfy certain consistency conditions, then they can be represented by a utility function as if the actor had real preferences.211
What does this have to do with the definitional question? The
economic setup allows a court to be concerned with whether the
actions of a legislature are consistent with the presence of animus
at the corporate level, which is to say with whether the imposition
of harm on a group of people makes a legislative act more choiceworthy or not. This shifts the focus from the actions (including
speech acts) of individual legislators to the actions of the legislative body. As a normative matter, this clearly relegates the motives of individual legislators to second-class status. The animus
of individual legislators matters only insofar as it manifests in
animus at the corporate level. This simplifies the analysis because we no longer have to come up with a theory of how individual animus traces through an aggregation process to taint the actions of corporate bodies; we simply ask whether the corporate
body itself acts out of animus. Since animus is, on this account, a
preference of the legislature, the evidentiary question is
208 See ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 5 (1995).
209 See id. at 9.
210 For example, if preferences are aggregated using majority voting, then it is unlikely that the entity’s preferences will be rational—specifically, transitive—even if all the
individual preferences are rational. This phenomenon is known as the Condorcet Paradox.
211 See MAS-COLELL ET AL., supra note 208, at 9–10.
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answered by the choices of the legislature. The proof—or disproof—of legislative animus is revealed by the legislature’s actions.
Is this attractive as a normative matter? Should courts care
only about whether the legislative process results in behavior
that is consistent with animus or not, and how would this approach differ from what might arise from subjective intent inquiries at the individual level? There are two consequences for judicial
review of focusing on the choices of the legislature rather than
expressions of intent by individual legislators. First, courts will
view with skepticism any legislation that evidences different concern for the well-being of different classes of persons, even if there
is no evidence that individual legislators harbored animus. Second, courts will, conversely, view favorably legislation that is consistent with a “taste” for equality, even if there is evidence of animus at the individual legislator level.
The definitional question is answered by reference to the motives of the legislature—animus is acting in a way that is consistent with assigning less weight to the well-being of certain
groups. The evidentiary question is answered solely by reference
to the actions of the legislature—animus is proven by the actions
of the legislature. What about the doctrinal question of whether
animus necessarily renders a law unconstitutional or whether a
legitimate government purpose can redeem the law? The setup
does not assume an answer to this question. Instead, it provides
a framework for implementing an animus test regardless of the
answer. In fact, we can ask a more specific question: For a given
amount of animus, how important does a legitimate government
purpose have to be in order to redeem the law? Will a showing of
a de minimis, but legitimate, government purpose do the job or
must the government benefit be sufficiently large that it outweighs any animus that is present? The approach I provide below
gives the Court a tool for calibrating the required solution for a
variety of answers to that question.
C. An Economic Approach
The Court’s problem is similar to the problem faced by the
lawmaker in Part II who is interested in deterring actors from
engaging in activities when they are motivated by animus but not
otherwise. The key insight in that context was that damages
could play an important role in deterrence because they had a
greater effect on people motivated by animus. The same insight
can be used here: by allowing the Court to screen laws through
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the use of compensatory damages, it becomes possible to deter
legislatures from enacting laws based in animus.
1. The screening effect of compensation.
Consider again the situation in which Congress is choosing
between an equal allocation of some good—which will certainly
be upheld by a court—and choosing its most preferred allocation,
which will be unequal if it either harbors animus for group 𝑗 or if
there are some legitimate benefits that accompany the inequality.
Suppose that Congress is compelled to transfer $𝑇 to group 𝑗
if it allocates food stamps unequally. The net effect of this transfer, from Congress’s perspective, is a loss of $𝑇 and a gain of $(1 −
𝛼)𝑇, for a net loss of $𝛼𝑇. Congress dislikes making this transfer
by as much as it harbors animus for group 𝑗.212 What is the effect
of increasing 𝑇? Can it be used to ensure that no unequal law was
motivated by animus?
Not quite. As the amount of animus 𝛼 falls, the deterrent effect of paying compensation to group 𝑗 also falls. As a result, it is
impossible to set the transfer high enough to ensure that laws do
not reflect any animus at all. Although it is not possible to ensure
that all laws pass free of animus, as 𝛼 shrinks, so too does the
amount of inequality that animus generates. Figure 1 illustrates
conceptually how the maximal amount of animus that exists in
any law decreases as the transfer increases. For example, at a
transfer of 19, no law will be passed in which the legislature values group 𝑗 at less than 50% of group 𝑖. If the court is concerned
with ensuring that Congress acts with some minimal level of regard for the well-being of group 𝑗, then it can do so by requiring a
transfer of the appropriate amount.

212

The lawmaker will prefer to implement the unequal allocation 𝑓𝑖∗ , 𝑓𝑗∗ and make the
transfer $𝑇 rather than allocate food stamps equally if 𝛼𝑇 ≤ 𝑢(𝑓𝑖∗ ) + (1 − 𝛼)𝑢(𝑓𝑗∗ ) + 𝑏(𝑓𝑖∗ −
𝑓

𝑓𝑗∗ ) − (2 − 𝛼)𝑢 ( ). The lawmaker’s objective function can be aligned with the socially optimal
2

one if the utility that goes to group 𝑗 from the allocation is taxed away by the government.
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FIGURE 1: COMPENSATION AND ANIMUS

A compensatory transfer mechanism can also ensure that a
law motivated by animus is redeemed by a legitimate government
purpose. For example, suppose that the doctrinal rule is that a
certain amount of animus motivating a law is permitted only if
the amount of legitimate government benefit exceeds some
threshold. We can represent the relative importance of these two
𝛼
motivations with the ratio 𝑏 , which is the animus of Congress toward group 𝑗 divided by the marginal legitimate benefit of inequality. For example, a ratio of 2 reflects a lawmaker whose animus toward group 𝑗 is twice the legitimate social benefit from
inequality. I will call this ratio the “animus taint,” which reflects
the relative subjective motivations behind the law. If the ratio is
sufficiently high, then animus played a much greater role than
legitimate government purposes in motivating the law.
Quantifying Congress’s preferences in this way allows for a
more flexible weighing of motivations than the all-or-nothing approach under which a law is redeemed in the presence of a legitimate government purpose. Figure 2 shows the effect of increasing
the compensatory transfer to group 𝑗 on the maximum amount of
animus taint among laws that are passed.
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FIGURE 2: COMPENSATION AND ANIMUS TAINT

Whereas Figure 1 showed that increasing the compensatory
transfer only begins to reduce the maximal amount of animus at
large transfers, Figure 2 shows that compensatory transfers begin
to reduce the maximal animus taint from the very beginning.
A constitutional rule prohibiting laws with more than a
threshold level of animus or animus taint is a severe standard.
An alternative rule might aim to ensure that the average amount
of animus or animus taint among promulgated laws does not exceed some threshold. For example, Figure 3 below illustrates the
average amount of animus and animus taint among laws that are
passed depending on the size of the compensatory transfer. When
it comes to the averages, the specific shape of the curves will depend on the statistical distributions of animus and legitimate government benefits, but the curves will always have a downward
trend. Note that the size of the compensatory transfer necessary
to ensure that no law exceeds a specified amount of animus or
animus taint is larger than the transfer necessary to ensure that
the average law does not exceed that amount.
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FIGURE 3: COMPENSATION AND AVERAGE ANIMUS/ANIMUS TAINT

In this way, bundling compensatory transfers to a group that
receives the short end of the stick under an unequal law can distinguish legislatures that are motivated by animus from those
that are motivated by a legitimate government purpose. The
scheme works in this way because transfers to the burdened
group are more unpleasant for a lawmaker motivated by animus
than a lawmaker that is motivated primarily by legitimate government purposes.
2. Clarifications and objections.
It is important to emphasize that compensatory transfers in
this scheme are designed to deter public officials from treating
certain persons or groups unequally out of animus. The transfers
can be calibrated to either purge the taint of animus from legislative inequality or ensure that any taint is washed away by a sufficient amount of legitimate government purpose. For this reason,
there is no necessary connection between the size of the transfer
and either the material disadvantage experienced by group 𝑗 from
the unequal law or the size of the legitimate benefit created by
the inequality. By contrast, other normative theories that require
government compensation to classes of persons that are
shortchanged by the legislative process tend to calibrate compensation by reference to one of these two amounts.
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For example, one normative criterion for legislation is KaldorHicks efficiency.213 This requires that the move away from equality
be justified because the legitimate benefits are so sufficiently
great in magnitude that they can be used to compensate group 𝑗
and make them better-off than they are under equality.214 Thus,
there is a close connection between the size of the legitimate benefits and the size of the transfer under Kaldor-Hicks efficiency but
not under the antianimus scheme.
In fact, if the goal is to screen out animus motives, compensatory transfers do not even need to be made to the specific persons who are treated unequally. If the people who are treated unequally are members of a class for which the legislature harbors
animus, then a mandatory transfer to any members of that class
will have the desired deterrent effects on legislatures motivated
by animus. For example, a prejudiced legislature will be deterred
from making an unequal allocation that disadvantages an ethnic
minority in one area of the law if, as a condition of doing so, it is
compelled to make a transfer of resources to other members of the
ethnic minority.
U.S. courts likely cannot compel governments to make appropriations as a condition of passing legislation that creates inequality between classes of persons, but they can interpret those
appropriations as evidence of the government’s intent. As the figures above illustrate, including a compensatory transfer will partially reveal the existence of any legislative animus and should
affect a court’s beliefs about legislative motives. Moreover, the
failure to include compensatory transfers with discriminatory legislation—or subsequent repeal of a compensatory rider—should
be viewed with suspicion, even in the absence of hostile public
statements made by members of the legislative body. Since the
cost of the transfers is small, and the benefit of having a law with
legitimate benefits upheld by a court is likely to be significant,
then a legislative body should be willing to make compensatory
transfers to encourage courts to find an absence of animus.
Is providing cash compensation to those treated unequally
akin to paying for the right to harm that group? This misunderstands the role that the compensation plays. If designed properly,
it will not be worth it for a legislature motivated by animus to
pass a discriminatory law. The effect of a compensatory rider is
213 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 63, 66 (1990).
214 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Distributive Justice and the Antitrust Laws, 51 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1, 10 (1982).
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to allow a legislature to credibly signal that it is not acting with a
discriminatory purpose, not to allow a legislature to act from a
discriminatory motive so long as they compensate the group that
is harmed. Thus, compensatory transfers have an expressive benefit. A legislature that includes a compensatory transfer with the
passage of a discriminatory law acknowledges as valid the concerns of minorities about being devalued in the legislative process
and puts its money where its mouth is in attempting to persuade
minorities that their interests are given equal weight.215
Compensatory transfers make it possible for legislatures acting from legitimate purposes to credibly communicate the intentions of their laws, and in doing so they can enhance the perceived
legitimacy of those laws.216 Enhancing the legitimacy of the law is
likely to have positive effects in general on the relationship between minority groups and the state and may result in better
compliance and less suspicion and resentment of discriminatory
laws.
For compensatory transfers to have this effect, however, the
form of the compensatory transfer must be tailored to the specific
kind of animus we are worried about. For example, I have been
focused on the case in which we are worried that the legislature
generally regards the well-being of one group less than another
group. There are a variety of factors that go into well-being, and
any one of those factors (including cash) can be used to make the
targeted group better-off and deter legislatures from acting on animus. What if, however, the legislature does not devalue the overall well-being of one group but thinks that some groups are entitled to more of a particular good than another?
For example, the legislature might assert that it values all
persons the same but that certain goods, such as the right to marriage, are more socially valuable in the hands of heterosexual couples than same-sex couples. Such a legislature will allocate more
of such rights to heterosexual couples. Compensatory cash
215 Some scholars argue that certain forms of discrimination create expressive harms
or are wrong by virtue of what they express. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 160, at 530 (arguing that when legislators act from bad intentions that give a law an “objective” stigmatizing expressive effect, then heightened scrutiny should be triggered); see also Elizabeth
S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148
U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1532 (2000); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive
Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances
After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483, 506–16 (1993). For some scholars, a law violates
equal protection when it fails the government’s obligation to treat each person with equal
concern. See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85
MINN. L. REV. 1, 13 (2000).
216 See Schwartzman, supra note 12, at 206–11.
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transfers in this scheme will not have any effect on the choice that
the legislature makes about how to allocate the good, because
cash is not a substitute from the perspective of the legislature for
marriage rights. If we think it is wrong to have unequal distributional preferences for particular goods, then we can only deter the
discriminatory lawmaker by requiring transfers of that good itself. Thus, it is harder for the government to credibly signal an
absence of animus when the relevant inequality being policed is
narrow or specific. For very particular goods—those for which
there is no other substitute for marriage equality—there are no
compensatory transfers possible.
This discussion has been motivated by a very simple model
about the relationship between resources and well-being. Specifically, it has assumed that allocating fewer resources to a group of
people is consistent with valuing their interests less than other
groups. Sometimes the opposite argument is made, and in this
case the scheme of compensatory transfers I have outlined will
founder. Sometimes legislators argue that depriving a group of
resources is actually in that group’s interests. For example, suppose that a certain group—Group A—was denied unemployment
benefits because, the legislators say, denying them these benefits
will induce them to work harder to find gainful employment, the
benefits of which they do not fully appreciate but are in their longterm interests.
On this account, the question is what justifies doing Group A
this favor, rather than extending to everyone the “privilege” of
being denied unemployment benefits. The legislature will resist
compensating Group A because doing so would undermine the putative mechanism through which financial deprivation is meant
to help them and because compensating everyone else who remains eligible for benefits is likely to be reasonably interpreted
not as compensating them for a harm but amplifying their favorable treatment. Compensatory riders will not help a legislature
credibly convey that they are acting for a legitimate purpose in
this case. I think the cases are rare where one can plausibly argue
that receiving a lesser share of some good is in one’s interest, but
when they do arise, the legislature will have to find ways other
than compensatory transfers to signal their impartiality.
3. Examples.
The idea of compensating individuals who are adversely affected by changes in law is a familiar one. For example, under the
Takings Clause, private property cannot be taken for public use
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without just compensation.217 But the history of government takings is tainted by the appearance of animus. Just compensation
has not historically been enough, or of the right kind, to purge
takings of this taint.218
In Kelo v. City of New London,219 Justices Clarence Thomas
and Sandra Day O’Connor injected language from equal protection doctrine into their dissents, expressing concerns that the
heightened power of the government to take property for private
benefit would likely impose a greater burden on low-income
groups.220 Between 1949 and 1973, governments have been five
times more likely to use eminent domain to displace African
Americans than other members of the population,221 and advocates have argued that it has been used to target racial minorities.222 These tendencies have been enabled by the expansion of
the power to cover “blight” removal.223 In several takings cases,
plaintiffs have alleged animus on the part of the government as
part of an equal protection claim that generally accompanies, but
is analyzed separately from, the takings claim.224 Although the
Supreme Court has held that such “class of one” equal protection
claims do not require an allegation of animus,225 lower courts have
not consistently applied this rule and some have in fact required
an allegation of animus.226
How might the economic approach work in two equal protection cases confronting animus? In Moreno, the Court considered
the constitutionality of § 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964,227
which generally excluded from the food stamp program any
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U.S. CONST. amend. V.
See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
219 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
220 Id. at 521–22 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The consequences of today’s decision are
not difficult to predict, and promise to be harmful . . . . [T]hese losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities.”); id. at 505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
221 Alison Somin, Eminent Domain and Race, THE FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 7, 2015),
https://perma.cc/FV9B-HF7W.
222 Brief of Amici Curiae National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
et al. in Support of Petitioners at 7, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108).
223 See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954).
224 See, e.g., Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998); Prater
v. City of Burnside, 289 F.3d 417, 431–32 (6th Cir. 2002); Cnty. Concrete Corp. v. Township
of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2006).
225 See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
226 See Michael S. Giaimo, Challenging Improper Land Use Decision-Making Under
the Equal Protection Clause, 15 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 335, 335 (2004) (“The [Olech] decision was a mere five paragraphs long, and seemingly very straightforward, but it has
prompted varied reactions and considerable disagreement in the lower courts.”).
227 Pub. L. No. 88-525, 78 Stat. 703.
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household with two unrelated individuals.228 The Court held that
the provision was not rationally related to the stated purpose of
the Act, and the most plausible purpose appearing in the history
of the legislation—animus toward hippies—could not constitute a
legitimate government purpose.229 If Congress wanted to persuade the Court that it had a legitimate purpose for its unequal
treatment of related and unrelated families, it could bundle with
the food stamp legislation another provision that provided, for example, direct income support to unrelated households below a certain income level.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,230 a Texas city
had a municipal ordinance requiring a special use permit to operate a group home for individuals who were “mentally retarded.”231
The city denied a permit and the plaintiffs brought suit alleging
unequal treatment.232 The Fifth Circuit held that “mental retardation” was a “quasi-suspect” classification and that the ordinance failed to survive scrutiny.233 On appeal, the Court overruled
the Fifth Circuit on the standard of review but held that the ordinance failed rational basis review, as applied.234 If the city of
Cleburne wanted to provide evidence of an absence of animus
with respect to housing access in particular, it might have bundled the ordinance with set asides for the affected persons in public housing or in housing that receives government property tax
subsidies. If, on the other hand, the animus concern is with respect to the interests of the disabled more generally, then direct
financial transfers would be sufficient to signal the absence of
animus.
Or consider voting rights. Restrictions on voting rights are
subject to their own distinct line of analysis, but we can consider
what a legislature concerned with inoculating a voting restriction
from equal protection challenges might do. Specifically, consider
a voter identification law that either has a discriminatory effect
or that incorporates a classification inviting rational basis review.
The Court might be concerned that the additional burden placed
on these groups was designed to discourage them from voting, but
the legislature is likely to argue that there is a legitimate purpose
such as deterring voter fraud. If the animus concern is about the
228
229
230
231
232
233
234

Moreno, 413 U.S. at 529.
Id. at 534.
473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id. at 435.
Id.
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Id. at 442, 450.
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regard the legislature has for the overall well-being of the burdened group, then any form of compensatory transfer will deter
legislative animus. But if the Court is concerned specifically that
the voting rights of all groups be valued equally, then the appropriate compensatory transfer must lower the cost of exercising
voting rights. For example, a legislature wanting to ward off an
equal protection challenge on this basis could bundle a voter identification law with funding for free transportation to the polls for
groups that are burdened or opening new polling stations in areas
with a higher concentration of such persons.
D. Improving the Animus Inquiry
The significance of animus in constitutional doctrine persists,
but it does so despite objections on multiple fronts. These objections are relevant to any legal rule in which subjective intent
plays a role. They call into question the existence, knowability,
efficacy, and relevance of subjective intent as a constitutive feature of the law. In a recent article, Professors Leslie Kendrick
and Micah Schwartzman label these the ontological, epistemic,
futility/taint, and relevance objections to intent-based inquiries.235 In this Section, I explain how the economic approach responds to these objections.
The economic approach assumes that individuals are concerned with whether the actions of public actors are consistent
with preferences that devalue the well-being of certain classes of
persons. This approach is in the core of the economics tradition of
revealed preference; it asks whether the choices of the legislature
are consistent with pursuing a particular set of objectives. Equal
protection, on this account, is not concerned with whether particular members of the legislature vote for a law out of animus but
whether the laws that the legislature passes are consistent with
animus of the corporate body itself. This approach is an example
of what Fallon would call an objective account of legislative intent, which ascribes purposes to the legislature based on objective
properties of the law itself rather than by inquiring into the mental states of individual lawmakers.236 Justice Elena Kagan’s
analysis of governmental motives in speech regulation is a leading example of this approach.237
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See Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 183, at 146, 148, 149, 151.
Fallon, supra note 160, at 541–53.
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1. Existence.
The first question about intent-based inquiries is whether intent is something that exists for corporate bodies.238 Consider, for
example, a discriminatory provision such as the one at issue in
Moreno, which denies food stamp benefits to households with unrelated persons. What does it mean to say that the exclusion was
intended to harm hippies? If we must locate group intent first in
the subjective intentions of actual individuals, whose intent matters? The form of legislation will generally reflect the authorship
and influence of many individuals, including legislators, staffers,
and lobbyists. If some of these individuals were motivated by animus, but some were not, then how does this affect the determination of the existence of group animus? What if a challenged provision was overdetermined, so that it would have made its way
into the bill even if the legislators who harbored animus for hippies had not supported it? If the animus did not change the content of the bill, does that matter? If legislators merely channel the
sentiments of their constituents, is the animus of the legislator
magnified by the number of constituents who harbor those feelings?
The economic approach answers the ontological problem by
changing the definition of intent, so that it no longer is based in
the subjective intentions of individuals, or at least it is only based
on those subjective intentions insofar as they influence the decisions of corporate bodies. The economic approach asks: Does the
legislature act as if it has bad intentions? The approach thereby
sidesteps questions about the process by which individual intentions should be aggregated to form a group intention. Whatever
the process by which legislators come to pass legislation, it is that
process that must be held to account. Thus, so long as public acts
are consistent with a process that gives equal weight to the interests of all persons, then those acts will be upheld. In its starkest
form, this approach generally ignores the statements and ancillary actions of public officials.
Ignoring individual animus in determining the existence of
group animus is not just convenient as an evidentiary matter or
a way to avoid trying to answer difficult questions—it also has
normative appeal. What exactly are individuals owed in the way
of equal treatment by the government? Are they owed that each
238 Skepticism abounds. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 428–32 (2005). But some philosophers disagree. See, e.g., MICHAEL
E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY 109–29
(1999); CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY, DESIGN, AND
STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 42 (2011).
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individual engaged in shaping the law not be motivated by animus when those individuals are acting in a public capacity?239 If
individuals do act out of animus in their public capacity, is the
grievance against the corporate body of which the bad actor is a
member or against the member herself? The economic approach
presumes that equal protection claims should be levelled against
corporate bodies when those corporate bodies act in a way that is
consistent with animus. This approach avoids questions like
whether the animus of one person creates a taint and what is required to cleanse that taint. It also avoids the need for a theory of
how individual animus translates into group animus.
2. Evidence.
The notion that courts are unfit to make factual determinations about congressional intent has a long pedigree.240 Kendrick
and Schwartzman call this the “epistemic objection,” which is that
“[c]ourts may not be able to know with any reliability what reasons motivated a particular action or decision.”241 This skepticism
is both natural and justified when there is no rigorous definition
of group intent to begin with. Which definition of group animus
we adopt will affect the epistemic demands. For example, if group
animus is defined as the share of individuals voting for a bill that
themselves harbored animus, then determining group animus requires evidence on the subjective state of mind of all legislators,
or at least as many as would be sufficient to show that a majority
harbored animus.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the Court relied both on public
statements made by Colorado officials and on the disparate
239 Some scholars hold this view. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 160, at 530 (observing
that legislators “have obligations—which I call ‘deliberative obligations’—not to pursue
constitutionally forbidden aims or to take official actions based on constitutionally forbidden motives.”); Carpenter, supra note 199, at 185 (emphasis in original):

[J]ust as individuals have a moral and sometimes legal duty not to act maliciously toward others, the group of people elected as representatives (or acting
in some other official governmental capacity) in a liberal democracy has a moral
and sometimes constitutional duty not to act maliciously toward a person or
group of people.
240 See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937) (“Inquiry into
the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of the courts.”). Courts have expressed ambivalence about extrinsic evidence of discriminatory intent when a law is facially neutral. E.g.,
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (“[W]e may consider plaintiffs’ extrinsic
evidence, but will uphold the policy so long as it can reasonably be understood to result
from a justification independent of unconstitutional grounds.”).
241 Kendrick & Schwartzman, supra note 183, at 148.

646

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:3

treatment of religion as evidence of religious animosity.242 Justice
Kennedy inferred from the silence of certain officials that they
acquiesced to the animus of those who made the problematic
statements.243 The Court then properly (under current law)
adopted a “totality-of-the-circumstances” approach to inferring
intent.244 This is the same approach used to identify discriminatory intent in the equal protection context for race.245 In general,
totality-of-the-circumstances approaches are indeterminate, leaving it to judicial idiosyncrasies to determine which features of the
circumstances are relevant and how much weight they should be
assigned in coming to an all-things-considered judgment.246
The economic approach largely disregards evidence about the
subjective intent of individual legislators. The normative reason
for this disregard is that the approach is concerned with the revealed preferences of the legislature, not the preferences of individual lawmakers. But there is an evidentiary reason as well for
devaluing assertions made by public officials in trying to infer
their intentions: such statements can be easily manipulated by
actors trying to insulate their behavior from constitutional scrutiny. Cheap talk by legislators can be used to mask animus, and
stray statements that suggest animus may not have had motivational force. Moreover, even innocuous answers are subject to misinterpretation. Whereas assertions about one’s intentions are
mostly costless, actions have consequences and are therefore generally more credible signals of intentions than verbal statements.247
3. Futility and taint.
The third objection to using intent as a criterion of constitutionality arises from a conundrum about the lasting effects of
striking down a law because of an impermissible motive. If a law
is struck down because of impermissible motives, then how
should courts review an identical law passed afterwards? Should
an evaluation of the new law include the bad motive for the old
law? Not doing so would seem naïve. On the other hand, if the
taint of the old law is inherited by the new law, then the new law
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246 See, e.g., Hayashi, supra note 158, at 312.
247 Many courts already disregard evidence of explicit bias in discrimination inquiries. Clarke, supra note 165, at 523.
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may never be enacted even if there are legitimate purposes for the
new law.
This conundrum arises from the use of public statements as
credible expressions of intentions. The economic approach shifts
attention away from what legislators say in the course of deliberating about a law toward what they do by passing the law. This
shift in focus is based on two claims. The first is that actions speak
not only louder but also more reliably than words. The second
claim is that the government speaks through what it does, and
that the expressions of motives by individual legislators are
largely irrelevant except insofar as they result in social priorities,
manifested in government actions, that reflect those motives.
Under this approach, statements made in connection with
passing the old law would be given very little weight in evaluating
the presence of animus in motivating the new law (or the old law,
for that matter). If the presence of a compensatory transfer is dispositive of the question of intent, then the absence of a transfer
with the old law will cause it to be struck down as unconstitutional. This determination is mostly irrelevant for evaluating the
passage of a subsequent law with the same discriminatory effect.
The legislature can pass a new law that burdens the same group
as the old law as long as they include an adequate compensatory
transfer to the class of persons that is burdened. If they include
such a transfer then, by hypothesis, the law is inconsistent with
legislative animus. Further, we do not need to worry about the
possibility that striking down a law motivated by animus will
taint subsequent laws passed for legitimate government purposes. All that is required to enjoy the presumption against animus is to include an adequate compensatory transfer to the burdened class.
4. Relevance.
The final objection to intent-based tests is simply that subjective intentions are not morally or legally relevant.248 On this view,
justification, not motivation, is what matters.249 Although this
view has some influence, the “permissibility objection” seems inconsistent with commonsense morality and many scholars argue
248 See Fallon, supra note 160, at 564–65. See generally SCANLON, supra note 53;
HELLMAN supra note 155.
249 For one view in this spirit, see Fallon supra note 160, at 529 (“[C]ourts should
never invalidate legislation solely because of the subjective intentions of those who enacted
it. Instead, in all cases, final determinations of statutes’ validity should depend on their
language and effects.” (emphasis in original)).
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that the intentions behind public actions can be relevant to their
moral and legal legitimacy.250 The economic approach does not answer the question of relevance; it assumes that animus is relevant.
CONCLUSION
The specter of animus looms over contemporary U.S. life. It
is expressed in criminal acts of mass violence and the actions of
public officials in their official capacities. Law and economics has
largely ignored the fact that individuals sometimes want to hurt
other people, and this blind spot hinders economics from helping
to address some of the most pressing legal problems of the day.
I show that animus can be straightforwardly incorporated
into law and economics analysis in a way that does not undermine
any of the core commitments of the economics approach and that
doing so can lead to novel legal prescriptions for deterring hate
crime. Damages, including punitive damages, multiply the deterrent effect of fines and automatically calibrate to provide greater
deterrence to individuals who harbor more animus. For individuals motivated by animus who cannot be deterred by any punishment imposed on them, acknowledging animus reveals the possibility of solidarity-deterrence schemes, under which communities
can thwart the objective of animus by supporting the very groups
and communities that the actor hates. In the midst of gridlock
over gun regulation and mental-health interventions as ways of
deterring mass-shooting hate crimes, new solutions are needed.
Incorporating animus also points the way to an economic approach for equal protection review of public acts. This approach
sidesteps or helps solve some of the thorniest questions of intentbased analyses. Together, these two examples of the benefits of
incorporating animus into economic models illustrate a rich new
vein of law and economics scholarship that incorporates otherregarding concerns more generally.

250 See, e.g., J. Morris Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953, 954 (1978) (“[L]aws passed for reasons of prejudice or animus frequently stigmatize those whom they burden.”).

